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This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of how cost-benefit
analysis should value child mortality. Recent research suggests that parents
are willing to pay twice as much to reduce risks that their children face,
compared to the amount that they are willing to pay to reduce their own risks.
In fact, all demographic groups-old, young, parents, and non-parents-give
priority to children when allocating scarce health-care resources. This simple
fact is currently ignored in cost-benefit analyses even though this "child
premium " has strong theoretical and empirical support. This Article uses the
child premium to illuminate a potential point of agreement between proponents
and critics of cost-benefit analysis and then uses it to highlight recurring
deficiencies in the way agencies respond to scientific innovation more
generally. Drawing on adaptive management theory and the concept of model
uncertainty, this Article proposes a framework-the alternate-models
approach-that allows agencies to experiment with innovations to cost-benefit
analysis like the child premium. This approach helps mitigate two problems in
administrative law. First, it allows agencies to drive innovation rather than
merely following it. Second, it forces agencies to communicate model
uncertainty more effectively than existing proposals. Overall, this Article seeks
to offer proponents and critics of cost-benefit analysis a way to move forward
and explore a host of innovations to cost-benefit analysis and its main
competitor, cost-effectiveness analysis.
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Introduction
In 2010 a car thief attempted to steal a car with a baby in the back seat.
The baby's parents, Aaron and Melanie Richman, were standing near the car at
the time. They grabbed the door handles and were dragged across the parking
lot. Melanie was thrown off the car just after breaking a window; Aaron held
on until he could climb in and beat the thief until he crashed the car. This
1. David Gardner, You're Not Taking Our Baby! Heartstopping Moment Two Young Parents
Risk Their Lives to Save Their Child in Dramatic Cariacking, DAILY MAIL (UK), Nov. 25, 2010,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1332864frwo-young-parents-risk-lives-save-baby-Kansas-
carjacking.html; Barbara Pinto, Caught on Tape: Parents Stop Cariacking to Save Baby, ABC NEWS,





pattern of parental behavior is an extreme example of a ubiquitous
phenomenon: adults value child safety more than their own. Because regulatory
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) measures the benefits of risk reductions by asking
about people's preferences for those risk reductions, agencies should arguably
incorporate a child premium into their analyses. In fact, there is copious support
for a child premium from stated-preference studies, field studies of parental
behavior, bioethics studies, and emergency vaccine distribution plans. These
ubiquitous preferences for child safety are currently ignored in the cost-benefit
analyses that calculate the benefits of such myriad things as decreasing air
pollution and increasing the crush-resistance of car roofs.
Although CBA remains a controversial decision-making tool, and it is a
polarizing force among many legal academics, this Article seeks to improve
rather than abandon CBA. Many environmental, health, and safety advocates
2are opposed to CBA. They argue that CBA does not, and perhaps cannot,
incorporate many values that are important to policy decisions. For example,
CBA ignores distributive justice3 and our potential moral commitments to
endangered species.4 Even if CBA models could capture more value judgments,
the inherent uncertainties in risk assessment arguably undermine its usefulness
as a decision tool.5 CBA is perhaps better at delaying regulatory action than
illuminating it.6 Despite its limitations, CBA can inject rigor into decision-
making to help discipline regulators and politicians who are acting in good
faith.7 Its rigor and conventions also make it harder (although certainly not
impossible) for political forces to dictate a regulatory decision.8 Regardless of
its merits, however, it is important to improve CBA, which is firmly entrenched
in administrative decision-making. President Obama's Executive Order 13,563
maintains the same core commitment to CBA as President Clinton's Executive
Order 12,866,9 which was itself a modified version of President Reagan's
2. Michael Livermore & Richard Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 48 HOUS. L.
REv. 1, 6 (2011).
3. Thomas McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 32, 73 (1998).
4. See id. at 58.
5. Id. at 56.
6. Id. at 26; see also Thomas McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.1 2341,
2343 (2002) (arguing that the requirements of CBA have effectively stymied action under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1972 and the Toxic Substances Control
Act).
7. Robert Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2004).
8. Compare THOMAS MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 156 (1991) ("[R]egulatory analysis can have the virtue of
restraining, or at least of exposing, inappropriate political considerations . . . ."), with Douglas A. Kysar,
Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on "Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, " 48 HOUS. L. REV.
43, 47 (2011) (noting that CBA is more pliable than ever before, leaving plenty of room for political
considerations to dominate rulemaking).
9. Compare Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557-
61 (1994), with Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
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Executive Order 12,291.10 In practice, "most major new environmental, health
and safety regulations must pass a cost-benefit test before they can be
adopted."" As Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz have succinctly noted,
"cost-benefit analysis is here to stay."' 2 Because CBA is pervasive and
influential, it is important to "mend" it.13 This is true even for those who would
ultimately prefer to end it.14
This Article offers a way for both proponents and critics of CBA to move
forward and improve CBA, even if they continue to engage in foundational
debates about whether or when agencies should conduct CBA.15 In order to
help motivate this process of mending CBA, this Article seeks to illuminate
two areas of potential agreement between CBA proponents and CBA critics:
the child premium and the alternate-models approach. The child premium
illustrates the potential to rigorously incorporate altruistic values within CBA's
primary measure of benefits-the value of a statistical life (VSL)." This
defense of the child premium also suggests that social science research can
uncover and justify other premiums. To help facilitate the incorporation of
these premiums into CBA, this Article outlines the alternate-models approach.
This approach provides agencies with a framework within which to experiment
with the child premium as well as other, potentially more impactful, CBA
innovations.
This Article begins with the seemingly uncontroversial idea of the child
premium. The general thrust of the child premium is unlikely to be
controversial among CBA critics.'7 Many of these critics criticize CBA for
failing to incorporate moral obligations and argue that agencies should use
more holistic decision procedures that allow them to consider obligations to
other citizens, foreign citizens, non-human animals, and perhaps even
10. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 131 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988), with Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557-61
(1994).
11. RICHARD REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 11 (2008).
12. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 2, at 13.
13. REvESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 10.
14. Kysar, supra note 8, at 76 ("[C]ost-benefit analysis may only represent lobbying in a
different, more specialized vernacular.. . . [P]roponents of environmental, health, and safety regulation
would do well to start talking the talk as best they can.").
15. For an overview of these debates from the perspective of CBA advocates, see MATTHEW
ADLER & ERIC POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2004) and MATTHEW
ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION 108-111 (2012). For an overview from the perspective of
a CBA critic, see DOUGLAS KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE (2010).
16. Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing Lives, Valuing Risks, and Respecting Preferences in Regulatory
Analysis, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 298, 298 (2009); see also, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL
ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003 5 tbl.Ib
(2003) [hereinafter EPA CLEAR SKIES].
17. Although CBA critics would probably embrace the general thrust of the child premium,
many are likely to consider the explicit monetization of childhood risk to be, at best, a regretful second-
best strategy that would be required only if CBA maintains its prominence in agency decision making.
See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING




ecosystems.18 Such a holistic, obligation-regarding decision procedure is likely
to provide extra weight to protecting children. 19 However, some scholars are
likely to view the child premium with suspicion because of methodological
concerns with the relevant empirical studies 20 and because of a structural
similarity between the child premium and controversial existence values in
environmental law.21 Therefore, Parts I and II of this Article defend this
seemingly simple innovation to CBA.
This defense of the child premium suggests that other premiums might be
defensible as well. Standing alone, the child premium provides a modest
change to CBA. It will have the greatest effect on regulations that primarily
prevent childhood fatalities and illnesses. It will have only a small impact on
regulations that reduce risks in the context of long-latency harms like cancer.
The child premium is most important as a proof-of-concept that CBA can
incorporate judgments about risk that would not fit into a standard actuarial
model. Larger payoffs come later when agencies adopt other alternate models.
Consider cancer premiums. Although a cancer premium faces difficult
challenges, the defensibility of the child premium should lead CBA critics to be
optimistic about the capacity of further research to establish-in a rigorous
way-that the cancer premium or other VSL innovations reflect legitimate,
well-informed, welfare-relevant preferences.
In order to motivate this further research, this Article explores a second
seemingly uncontroversial idea. When agencies conduct CBA, they should
acknowledge the uncertainties involved in their calculations. This idea is likely
to be least controversial when the relevant uncertainties concern value
judgments rather than merely technocratic judgments. Agencies do not have
expertise in value judgments, nor do they have a sufficient democratic pedigree
to conclusively make those judgments.22 Because valuing different lives
differently has obvious normative implications, agencies could report CBA
both with and without a child premium. Similarly, they could report CBA both
with and without other VSL innovations.
Both advocates and critics of CBA appear to agree on the advisability of
reporting CBA with multiple conceptions of how to value lives and diseases.
Matthew Adler, a proponent of CBA, has made a similar suggestion with
regard to his proposed alternative to traditional CBA, which entails specifying a
social welfare function that can incorporate both efficiency and equity
18. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 210-15; KYSAR, supra note 15, at 123-99.
19. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 69-70, 74. See Section 1.B for empirical
support for this prediction.
20. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 104-05 (2003) (discussing limitations of stated-preference
studies).
21. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 133-36.
22. See Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1703 (1995).
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concerns.23 He argues that agencies should employ both traditional CBA and
his variant of it side by side.2 4 If the analyses point to the same policy outcome,
then the case for that outcome is strong. 25 If they diverge, then agencies could
seek input from Congress or the President.26 Douglas Kysar, a critic of CBA,
has also embraced the general idea of reporting CBA results using multiple
assumptions about how CBA should value mortality and morbidity.27 At least
in those cases where agencies should use CBA, Kysar suggests that they should
report the results of a traditional CBA alongside alternative results that rely on
other ways of valuing lives or other ways of aggregating those values. 2 8
Because a great deal of work must be done even to justify the seemingly
uncontroversial child premium, this Article can only offer an initial outline of
the alternate-models approach. After providing this outline, this Article breaks
off and addresses one piece of a fuller defense of this approach. It outlines the
promise of adopting the alternate-models approach and argues that its potential
benefits are sufficiently weighty as to justify a more detailed treatment, which
will be the subject of future work.
Part I of this Article provides a broad overview of the evidence supporting
the child premium. Parents are willing to pay almost twice as much to reduce a
given risk that their child faces compared to the amount they are willing to pay
to reduce an equivalent risk that they themselves face. In fact, all groups of
people-parents, non-parents, the young, and the elderly-give priority to
children. Part II addresses a long series of objections to the child premium and
ultimately concludes that the child premium reflects well-informed, welfare-
relevant preferences that should be incorporated into CBA. Part III discusses
the advantages of the alternate-models approach as a mechanism of
incorporating the child premium and other VSL innovations into CBA. Part IV
23. Matthew Adler, Risk Equity, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (2008). Adler's proposal is
narrower and addresses different problems than the alternate-models approach. He does not seek to
institutionalize the practice of considering alternate models and does not discuss the possibility that
doing so would spur technocratic research and normative debate. Instead, his proposal is meant to help
agencies develop experience with his social welfare function (SWF) approach so that they can
incorporate equity concerns into CBA. Id. at 46, 47. For other suggestions similar to the alternate-
models approach, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 30 (2003) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR A-4] ("You should consider
providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY [the value of a statistical life-year], while recognizing the
developing state of knowledge in this area."), and Matthew Adler, Welfare Polls, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1875, 1895 (2006) ("[lIt seems at least plausible that policy evaluation with a nonmonetary scale should
be considered as an alternative or supplement to cost-benefit analysis . . . .").
24. Adler, supra note 23, at 46 ("My proposal, therefore, is that agencies and policy analysts
employ [an equity-sensitive social welfare function approach] in conjunction with CBA.").
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See KYSAR, supra note 15, at 256.
28. Id. ("[W]hen engaging in an economic benefit analysis ... the agency shall also present
calculations using alternative measures of value, such as willingness-to-accept . . . equity-weighted
welfare functions, or objective measures, such as those underlying the United Nations Human
Development Index.").
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Statistical Children
discusses two extensions. First, it explores another VSL innovation-the cancer
premium. Second, it discusses the implications of the child premium for cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA), an alternative to CBA that is particularly popular
in the health care field.
I. The Value of a Statistical Child
Valuing the lives of children presents a puzzle for CBA. CBA measures
regulatory benefits by inquiring into people's risk-wealth tradeoffs. But
children have neither the money nor the maturity to make those tradeoffs.
Agencies should look to parents to make those tradeoffs for their children.
Numerous methodologically diverse studies reveal that parents value their
children's safety more highly than their own. This same child premium is
visible in studies of the general public.
The parental and societal studies that support the child premium illustrate
that people value childhood risk reductions more than equivalent risk
reductions that benefit adults. This is distinct from the idea that children are
sometimes more vulnerable than adults, and hence at greater risk given the
same stimulus. For example, children are at greater risk from food-borne
pesticides because they eat more food (as a function of their body weight) than
adults, and are also differentially vulnerable to chemicals that interfere with
developmental processes.29  Others have discussed differences in
vulnerability; 30 the studies in the next two sections control for differences in
vulnerability and focus on differences in value. Of course, if a child is more
vulnerable and reducing her risk is more valuable, then agencies have twice the
number of reasons to focus on protecting children.
A. The Parental Perspective
Cost-benefit analysis is rooted in a commitment to increasing welfare. It
uses a preference-based account of welfare; a person's welfare is improved
29. Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children's Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims,
7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 89, 97, 128 (2005) (stating that children are more vulnerable than adults to
pesticides).
30. See, e.g., id. at 97-98, 128. Both an Executive Order and the Food Quality Protection Act
(FQPA) already encourage agencies to consider increased child vulnerability. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(iv)
(implementing a 1Ox additional safety factor for children); Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885
(Apr. 21, 1997) ("[C]hildren may suffer disproportionately from environmental health risks and safety
risks. These risks arise because: children's neurological, immunological, digestive, and other bodily
systems are still developing; children eat more food, drink more fluids, and breathe more air in
proportion to their body weight than adults . . . . Therefore . . . each Federal agency . . . shall make it a
high priority to identify and assess environmental health risks and safety risks that may
disproportionately affect children .... ); Klass, supra note 29, at 97-98 (discussing the FQPA).
31. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
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when her preferences regarding how to make trade-offs between risk and
wealth are satisfied.3 The EPA, for example, uses twenty-six studies to
ascertain the average person's risk-wealth trade-off.33 Twenty-one of these
studies examine the relationship between wages and on-the-job risks, and
calculate workers' risk-wage tradeoff.34 Five other studies rely on stated-
preference surveys, which ask people's willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce a
certain risk in a certain context.35 The EPA then averages these results, and
comes up with the VSL.3 6
Because CBA is rooted in a preference-based account of welfare, it has
difficulty accounting for children. Infants, for example, have no discernible
preferences for the vast majority of risks. Even once children can comprehend
risk, they are insufficiently mature to make the relevant decisions.37 Finally,
even mature children would face an extreme wealth effect. Having no money,
their WTP would be zero.
How then might agencies value risk reductions for children? There are
two main contenders. First, agencies might hypothesize about what the average
child would be willing to pay if she had the average amount of money and an
adequate understanding of risk. The answer might be that the child would be
willing to pay what the average adult is willing to pay under similar risk-
reducing circumstances.38 So agencies might simply use their existing VSL for
both adults and children. Second, agencies might look to the preferences of the
child's parents. A parent would then be able to provide one VSL for herself,
and another for her child. In theory, the VSL she provides for her child may be
higher than, lower than, or equal to her own. Agencies should favor the second
approach. Both approaches provide estimates of the welfare effects of risk
reductions for children, but the second is more tailored, more in line with other
legal practices, and more consistent with a preference-based account of welfare.
The hypothetical preference approach-setting a child's VSL equal to the
average adult's VSL-has the advantages of ease and practicability. But these
advantages come at a cost. Adults and children might respond differently to
omb/inforeg/201 1_cb/201 1cbareport.pdf; ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 19; Amy Sinden et al.,
Cost Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48,49 (2009).
32. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 12, 19.
33. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES app. tbl.B-1
at B-2 (2010) [hereinafter EPA 2010 GUIDELINES].
34. Id. (referring to wage studies as studies using "labor market" methodology).
35. Id. (referring to stated-preference studies as using a "contingent valuation" methodology).
36. Id.
37. For a discussion of whether and to what extent children can meaningfully make decisions
about their own risk-tradeoffs, see Sandra Hoffmann, Since Children Are Not Little Adults--Socially-
What's an Environmental Economist To Do?, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 209, 221-28 (2007).
38. A more sophisticated version might attempt to predict and correct for generational effects
in risk preferences. For example, if each generation tends to be richer than the one before it, and
increased wealth increased WTP for safety, then agencies might adjust the current adult VSL upward




exposure to pesticides.39 If so, then measures of adult preferences might
undervalue risk reductions for children. Additionally, because adults have
already developed human capital and amassed savings, they are differently
affected by some non-fatal injuries.
The parental-preference approach has three key advantages over one
rooted in hypothetical preferences. 40 First, it can take account of the various
differences between children and adults. Parents have the best information
about their child's welfare, and most parents will use this informational
advantage to improve their child's welfare.41 Parents are therefore in a
particularly good position to make risk-wealth tradeoffs for children.
Second, relying on parental preferences aligns agency practice with other
areas of the law that regulate child safety. The vast majority of child safety
decisions are delegated to parents. Parents decide which safety devices to buy,
how to supervise their children, and which activities to prohibit.42 Parents have
wide latitude to make these decisions in part because parents normally make
choices that benefit their children.
Third, agencies that wish to impose more risk reduction than parents
prefer may be wasting their time. We do no favors to parents or children by
forcing well-informed and well-motivated parents to purchase more safety then
they desire. This just prevents them from spending money to improve their
children's welfare along some other dimension.43 Disregarding parental
preferences also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of safety
39. Thomas McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA 's
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 113(2001).
40. Using such preferences appears at first glance to be in tension with a major justification of
CBA. The traditional defense of CBA is that it (mostly) tracks Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. ADLER, supra
note 15, at 98, 100, 104. The Kaldor-Hicks test was designed so that outcomes could be ranked without
having to rely on interpersonal utility comparisons. See id. at 89, 92, 98. A regulation satisfies the
Kaldor-Hicks test if the winners could compensate the losers through a costless lump-sum transfer such
that no one was left worse off and at least one person was made better off. Id. at 98-99. Each regulatory
winner decides herself how much she is willing to pay for the regulation, and each regulatory loser
decides herself what amount of money she would require in compensation. Id. at 92. Thus, no
interpersonal utility comparisons are needed. Id. Although the Kaldor-Hicks test eschews interpersonal
utility comparisons, using parental preferences as proxies for child preferences requires interpersonal
utility comparisons between parents and children. However, this should not be controversial.
Economists who study the family routinely allow them. Robert Pollack, Gary Becker's Contributions to
Family and Household Economics, I REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 111, 117 (2003); see also, e.g., JOHN F.
ERMISCH, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FAMILY 53 (2003). Further, other defenses of CBA embrace
the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons between all persons, ADLER & POSNER, supra note
15, at 25, 39-43, and hence do not create barriers to using one person's preferences as a proxy for
another's.
41. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."). Of course, parental
authority is not unlimited. Id. at 606.
42. Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 547, 551
(2000).
43. For an analogous argument about regulation and poverty, see Cass Sunstein, Valuing Life:
A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L. J. 385, 441 (2004).
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regulations aimed at children. A parent who believes that a safety regulation is
unnecessary might reallocate other resources to undo the effects of the
regulation. For example, a parent who believes her children are already
adequately safe when they ride bikes might react to a mandatory helmet law by
supervising her children's biking less often or less thoroughly.44 In this way the
parent can convert the extra safety into a more fungible medium-here, time-
and invest that time in the way she thinks best. This phenomenon is often
referred to as risk compensation and is significantly more likely to occur when
45
people think the relevant regulation is unnecessary.
So far, this section has argued that parental preferences can serve as a
proxy for child preferences and hence provide a good estimate of the welfare
effects of childhood risk reduction.46 In part this is so because parents are well-
informed about their children and are normally motivated to improve the
welfare of their children.47 But, of course, not all parents are well-informed or
well-motivated.
To deal with parents who are not well-informed about their children, or
who are not well-motivated, agencies should look to family law for guidance.
44. B. A. Morrongiello & K. Major, The Influence ofSafety Gear on Parental Perceptions of
Injury Risk and Tolerance for Children's Risk Taking, 8 INJ. PREVENTION 27, 27-29 (2002) (finding that
parents allowed their children to take more risks when their children were using safety equipment,
including allowing their child to ride a bicycle at greater speed if the child was wearing a helmet).
45. For overviews of risk compensation, see Michael M. Cassell, Risk Compensation: The
Achilles' Heel of Innovations in HIV Prevention?, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 605 (2006) and James Hedlund,
Risky Business: Safety Regulations, Risk Compensation and Individual Behavior, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 82
(2000).
46. Once we decide to rely on parental preferences, a second question emerges: How should
we elicit those preferences? Standard WTP surveys ask subjects to make a tradeoff between their own
safety and their own wealth. As applied to children, this structure would require the parent to make
tradeoffs between the child's safety and the child's wealth. Studies of parental preferences instead ask
parents to make tradeoffs between their child's safety and the parent's wealth. There are two reasons to
believe that the latter question is likely to provide a better estimate of the welfare effects of childhood
risk reductions, despite the fact that it does not perfectly map onto the structure of standard WTP
surveys.
First, the two questions overlap. Parents contribute to their children's future income, not just their
children's safety. Parents often pay for college if they can, and contribute in numerous ways to preparing
their child to earn a living. When parents consider tradeoffs between their money and their child's
safety, they are also making tradeoffs between their child's safety and their child's future income. Thus,
existing studies already capture the child-safety vs. child-income, albeit in an imperfect way.
Second, it is likely that these imperfections are preferable to the imperfections that would
accompany asking parents to make tradeoffs between the child's safety and the child's wealth. Such a
tradeoff is likely to be quite unfamiliar; generally parents cannot borrow against their child's future
income both because it is too difficult to predict and because they have no rights to encumber that future
income stream. More importantly, such a tradeoff requires the parent to ignore her own desire (and
perhaps also her deeply felt obligation) to provide for her child. Because questions that ask parents to
make these tradeoffs would require the parent to engage in an unfamiliar and objectionable type of
transaction, these questions are likely to result in a large number of protest responses and untrustworthy
data.
47. The fact that children have motivated and knowledgeable proxies (their parents) to speak
for their welfare distinguishes the child premium from the issues surrounding future generations. See
KYSAR, supra note 15, at 174 (noting the need to "render future generations more visible to us, closer,




Child welfare law imposes a minimum standard of protection that parents owe
their children.48 Agencies concerned that parents may not value children highly
enough might similarly impose a floor. This is exactly what the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) did in 2003. It recommended that child VSLs
be at least as high as adult VSLs, but left open the possibility that child VSLs
49would be higher. It is perhaps telling that this is the only deviation from a
uniform VSL that the OMB endorses. The OMB ignores all other
heterogeneityso despite robust evidence that the VSL is influenced by the nature
of the risk and various demographic characteristics of the person facing that
risk."
This Article's primary concern is with the average parent, not with outlier
parents. A copious amount of data suggests that the average parent is far from
this floor already. She is willing to pay significantly more to reduce risks to her
children than to reduce risks to herself.
There are eleven relevant studies that calculate and compare the WTP of
parents for equivalent risk reductions that benefit themselves or their children.52
The nine published studies unanimously find a child premium. The child
premium emerges from three studies examining real-world parental behavior,
and six studies that rely on survey data. These studies have found a child
premium in the context of both fatal and non-fatal harms, and for both risky
and riskless choices. Despite this study diversity, estimates for the child
premium are roughly consistent, ranging from 32% to 160%, with a median of
80%. Two unpublished studies find mixed support for a child premium.
The remainder of this section describes and defends these studies in detail.
Readers who wish to skip the sometimes-detailed discussions in this section
should feel free to turn to Part I.B.
The three published revealed-preference studies that examine the child
premium find support for it. Each of these studies analyzed real-world parental
consumption in order to test whether parents exhibited a child premium. The
first study analyzed health status and actual health utilization data for 6,557
U.S. households. These households were more likely to seek out health care
when the child, as opposed to the parent, was in a poor health state (as reported
by the parent).54 This pattern was robust to several different definitions of
48. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 157, 172 (2004) (describing the genesis
of the current child protective services regime with its focus on abuse and neglect).
49. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 31.
50. W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation ofLife, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 103, 109 (2009).
51. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 405-16.
52. For a list of studies that I excluded and the reasons justifying that exclusion, see infra
notes 61 & 72.
53. Mark Agee & Thomas Crocker, Does Parents' Valuation of Children's Health Mimic
Their Valuation of Own Health?, 21 J. POPULATION ECON. 231, 231 (2008).
54. Id. at 246.
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health-care utilization and appeared in various subsamples of the data.55
Overall, the data suggest an 80% child premium. 56 The second study examined
the smoking behavior of 1,500 smoking mothers who reported the amount of
second hand smoke their child is exposed to.5 Utilizing variation in the price of
cigarettes and health care, the authors estimated a series of substitution rates
between a mother's consumption and her and her child's health.ss The authors
estimated that mothers value their children's health 58% higher than their
own.59 The third study compared adults' seat belt usage with their usage of
child safety seats in cars. The authors derived VSL estimates for adults and
children and found a 32% child premium.
Stated-preference studies provide additional evidence for a child
premium. Stated-preference studies use hypothetical questions to elicit WTP
for a given risk reduction. These studies face a number of well-worn criticisms
62that stem from their use of hypothetical questions. For example, people may
not have sufficient incentives to answer hypothetical questions accurately.63
Despite these limitations, the OMB recommends using both revealed and
stated-preference studies to value the benefits of regulation." This is in line
with current agency practice. Agencies use stated-preference surveys to help
measure the VSL and to measure the benefits attributable to preventing
injuries, 6 bronchitis,6 7 upper and lower respiratory symptoms, asthma, and
decreased visibility from air pollution.70
55. Id. at 245-46.
56. Id. at 244.
57. Mark Agee & Thomas Crocker, Children's Health Benefits of Reducing Environmental
Tobacco Smoke Exposure: Evidence from Parents Who Smoke, 32 EMPIRICAL ECON. 217, 218-19, 223
(2007).
58. Id. at 218.
59. Id. at 234.
60. Glenn Blomquist et al., Values of Risk Reduction Implied by Motorist Use of Protection
Equipment: New Evidence from Different Populations, 30 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 55, 59-62 (1996).
61. Glenn Blomquist, Self-Protection and Averting Behavior, Values of Statistical Lives, and
Benefit Cost Analysis ofEnvironmental Policy, 2 REv. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 89, 102 (2004) (interpreting
data from Blomquist, supra note 60). One revealed-preference study goes against this trend at first
glance. Robin Jenkins et al., Valuing Reduced Risks to Children: The Case ofBicycle Safety Helmets, 19
CONTEMP. ECON. POLICY 397 (2001). It analyzed data on the costs of bike helmets, their effectiveness,
and the percentage of people who wear them. Using this data, the authors estimated that the lower bound
of the adult VSL was about $2 million and lower bound of the child VSLs were about $1.3 million. Id.
at 404. The results are driven by the fact that children's helmets cost half as much as adult helmets.
Because children's helmets cost about 40% less than adult helmets, there is simply no opportunity for
adults to show a greater WTP for child safety. Id. at 403. Accordingly, the authors only claimed to be
illuminating the lower bound of VSL estimates for adults and children. Id. at 407.
62. Karen Blumenschein et al., Eliciting Willingness to Pay Without Bias: Evidence from a
Field Experiment, 118 ECON. J. 114, 114 (2008).
63. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 24.
64. Id.
65. EPA 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 33, at B-I to B-2.
66. Memorandum from Polly Trottenberg, Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Policy, & Robert S.
Rivkin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Office of the Sec. of Transp. to Secretarial Officers &




Stated-preference surveys are particularly unproblematic in the context of
the child premium. Suppose that subjects are likely to provide inflated WTP
estimates in response to hypothetical questions because they do not adequately
consider their budget constraints.7 1 This would bias the resulting VSL upward.
But, as long as subjects are profligate for both themselves and their children,
the ratio of the two VSL estimates will be less biased than the underlying VSL
estimates themselves. Using stated-preference studies to ascertain the child
premium-or any other ratio of two WTP estimates given by the same
subject-also mitigates wealth effects, framing effects, scope insensitivity,
social desirability bias, and the effects of cognitive errors related to risk
perception. Subsection II.A.3 confronts these and other standard critiques of
stated-preference surveys in detail, and shows that each critique is less
powerful in the context of the child premium than it is in the context of
estimating the subjects' WTP for their own safety. Because agencies commonly
use stated-preference studies to estimate subjects' WTP to reduce their
mortality and morbidity risk, using these studies to calculate a child premium
should be uncontroversial.
The six published stated-preference studies that examined the child
premium found results that are consistent with the revealed-preference
studies.72 The first two examined fatal risks, the second two examined both
fatal and non-fatal risks, and the final two examined non-fatal illnesses.
2011 Interim Adjustment (July 29, 2011) (citing REBECCA S. SPICER & TED R. MILLER, FINAL REPORT
TO THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS OF
QUALITY ADJUSTED LIFE YEARS LOST (Pacific Inst. for Res. & Evaluation) (2010)).
67. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICLE
POLLUTION, CHAPTER 5: BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 50 (2006).
68. Id. at 52.
69. Id. at 53.
70. Id. at 60-61.
71. Blumenschein et al., supra note 62, at 115 ("[H]ypothetical responses sometimes
substantially overestimate willingness to pay.").
72. 1 excluded two published stated-preferences studies that, because of the risks they studied,
could not make clear theoretical predictions about whether children or adults would benefit more from
the hypothetical intervention. The first study elicited WTP for a device that would prevent its user from
being involved in any type of traffic accident (as a pedestrian, biker, driver, passenger, etc.) and
compared WTP for adults and children. Henrik Andersson & Gunnar Lindberg, Benevolence and the
Value of Road Safety, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 286, 288 (2009). It found a child
premium. Id. at 291-92. But it did not attempt to control for the possibility that subjects may have
thought that children were at greater risk. See id. Therefore, it is difficult to know whether the subjects
valued children's lives more highly, or rather thought that children would benefit more from the safety
device. The second study elicited household level WTP to relocate to a neighborhood with a "lower risk
level" and WTP for a public safety program that would lower everyone's "risk" by 20%. Joanne Leung
& Jagadish Guria, Value of Statistical Life: Adults Versus Children, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 1208, 1210 (2006). It compared WTP estimates for households with children to WTP
estimates of households without children and found mixed support for a child premium. Id. at 1215 tbl.6.
But because the study used an undefined "risk" and did not specify baseline risks, see id. at 1210, it is
impossible to know whether a head of household who wanted to value all members of her household
equally would increase or decrease her WTP if one household member were a child. If children were
relatively unaffected by the "risk," then we would expect lower WTP for equally sized households with
children simply because they get less benefit from the program. For example, if children travel fewer
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In 2010 researchers asked a large national sample of parents about their
WTP to reduce food-borne pesticide risks to themselves and their children. 3
More specifically, they were asked their WTP to reduce the risk of a disease
that, after various latency periods, would result in two years of sickness
followed by death.74 Based on their responses, the authors calculated VSLs for
children and parents. The VSL for parents was $7.5 million.76 This is in line
with other VSL estimates in the adult population. The VSL for children was
$13.5 million.7 8 This reflects an 80% child premium. 7 9
This study contained features that mitigate several common concerns
about stated-preference studies, including the use of visual aids to communicate
risk information, giving parents practice questions, and controlling for the
parents' subjective risk assessments where they deviated from the risk
information given in the survey.so These methodological safeguards appear to
have helped: very few respondents refused to answer the questions, and WTP
was a function of the risk reduction.8'
A 2011 article reported the results from two surveys that assessed adult
and child VSLs separately.82 In the first, they asked parents of children with
asthma to make a series of hypothetical choices among asthma medications for
their child.83 In the second study, they asked adults from the general population
to imagine that they suffered from asthma, and to make hypothetical choices
among asthma medications for themselves.84 These medications presented a
trade-off between efficacy and the risk of a fatal side effect.85 The study then
compared the parents' WTP to reduce their children's risk with other adults'
miles in cars than adults (as is the case, see TIMOTHY MOUNT ET AL., REPORT TO THE ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, AUTOMOBILE SAFETY AND THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE IN THE FAMILY: VALUING
REDUCED RISK FOR CHILDREN, ADULTS AND THE ELDERLY 33-37 (2000)), then a household with one
parent and one child would benefit less from some traffic safety measures than a household with two
driving adults.
73. James Hammitt & Kevin Haninger, Valuing Fatal Risks to Children and Adults: Effects of
Disease, Latency, and Risk Aversion, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 57, 63 (2010).
74. Id. at 63-65.
75. Id. at 70.
76. Id.
77. W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction and
Overview, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 9 (2010). This suggests that the disparity between the parent's
VSL and the child's VSL represents a child premium rather than a parent discount.
78. Hammitt & Haninger, supra note 73, at 70.
79. Id. at 81.
80. Id. at 63-67.
81. Id. at 65, 67, 72, 80.
82. Blomquist et al., Willingness to Pay for Improving Fatality Risks and Asthma Symptoms,
33 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 410,413-14 (2011).
83. Id. at 414.
84. Id. at 415.




WTP to reduce their own. 86 Adult VSLs were lower than child VSLs.87 Overall,
parents were willing to pay about 70% more for equivalent risk reductions.88
Like the 2010 study, these studies contained features that mitigated
common concerns about stated-preference surveys. In each, subjects were
informed about the risks of the asthma and the comparative risk of the medicine
vs. driving (all medicines were safer than driving).89 To reduce the potential
differences between hypothetical choices and actual ones, the researchers
measured the subjects' confidence in their choices; only those that said they
would "definitely" buy the medicine at a given price/risk/efficacy tradeoff were
counted as willing to purchase it.90 This improves the accuracy of hypothetical
choice studies because the correlation between hypothetical intent to purchase
and actual purchasing behavior is strong when subjects report a high degree of
confidence.9 1
Two studies examined the child premium in the context of risks that
presented the possibility of both illness and death. In one, subjects were
informed about the risk of food-borne illnesses, which could, in some cases,
lead to death.92  Parents were willing to pay about 1.7 to 2.6 times more to
reduce the probability that their child would contract one of these diseases.93 In
the second study, subjects were informed about skin cancer risks and asked
about their WTP for sunscreens that would reduce those risks.94 Parents again
exhibited a 2x child premium.95
Parents also exhibit a child premium when making decisions about
alleviating symptoms of a child's non-fatal illness. In one study, parents were
willing to pay approximately twice as much to relieve bronchitis symptoms in
their children as they were to relieve bronchitis symptoms in themselves.96 An
earlier study found a 2x child premium for preventing colds. 97
86. Id. at 423.
87. Id. at 420.
88. Id. at 423 (comparing the VSL for adults who were around the average age with the VSL
for mean-aged children).
89. Id. at 414.
90. Id. at 414-19.
91. Blumenschein et al., supra note 62, at 115-16, 130 (collecting studies and confirming
results with a field experiment).
92. James K. Hammitt & Kevin Haninger, Willingness To Pay for Food Safety: Sensitivity to
Duration and Severity ofIllness, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1170, 1170-71 (2007).
93. Id. at 1175.
94. Mark Dickie & Shelby Gerking, Valuing Children's Health: Parental Perspectives, in
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISKS TO CHILDREN 137-40 (P. Scapecchi ed.,
2006).
95. Id. at 144.
96. Mark Dickie & Victoria L. Messman, Parental Altruism and the Value of Avoiding Acute
Illness, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1146 (2004).
97. Jin-Tan Liu et al., Mother's Willingness to Pay for Her Own and Her Child's Health, 9
HEALTH ECON. 319 (2000).
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Although each of the nine published studies finds evidence of a child
premium, two unpublished studies find only mixed support for it. The first
compared the car purchases of households with children to those of households
without children.98 Because purchasing a car is, in part, a tradeoff between cost
and safety, the authors could estimate the household's VSL. By presuming that
all adults have the same VSL, they could then estimate the VSL of adults and
children separately.99  The data revealed a child premium under some
assumptions but not others. The existence and amount of the child premium
depended on assumptions about the number of miles that children are in the
car 00 and on how the authors controlled for income. 01 The second unpublished
study analyzed the stated preferences of Italian and Czech parents.o 2 It found a
40-60% child premium for preventing respiratory illnesses and traffic accidents
but failed to find a child premium for preventing cancers. 103
The studies discussed above provide fairly strong evidence of a child
premium.104 Although the two unpublished studies only find a child premium
under some assumptions, the nine published studies unanimously find a child
premium, and they do so with a range of different methodologies (stated and
revealed-preference studies of both fatal and non-fatal harms in both risky and
riskless choice settings). Estimates of the child premium from published studies
range from 32% to 160%, with a median of 80%.
B. The Societal Perspective
The studies described in the previous section go a long way toward
advocating a child premium. But there is no need to rely just on stated and
revealed-preference studies of parental preferences to support the child
98. MOUNT ET AL., supra note 72, at 1.
99. Id. at 40-41.
100. Id. at 35-37, 62.
101. Id. at 41. As income rises, so too should one's WTP for safety and hence one's VSL. An
"income elasticity" of one means that a 10% rise in income yields a 10% rise in the VSL. An income
elasticity of two means that a 10% rise in income yields a 20% rise in the VSL. Using an income
elasticity of 0.3 yielded an adult premium, using an income elasticity of one yielded a child premium. Id.
at 41. There is no consensus on which elasticity estimate is more accurate, but both theory and the most
recent data suggest that the income elasticity of the VSL is at least one. Thomas J. Kniesner et al., Policy
Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile
Regressions, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 15, 18-19 (2010) (reporting income elasticities of 1.23-2.24
and arguing that these are more accurate and more consistent with theory than past estimates).
102. Anna Alberini & Milan Scasny, Context and the VSL: Evidence from a Stated Preference
Study in Italy and the Czech Republic 2 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 455, 2010).
103. Id. at 28.
104. One clarification is in order. The various risks in the studies above reflect harms that
could come about during childhood, such as a cold, bronchitis, cancer with a short latency period,
sudden injury from auto accident, asthma medication side effects, or acute health problems. The
evidence for a child premium, therefore, is rooted in parental preferences to reduce risks that children
face while children. The evidence does not yet support a premium for risks that children face that will




premium. As this section shows, the general population also exhibits a child
premium.
Bioethics researchers have sought to understand how the general public
would allocate scarce livers, vaccines, and even highway safety funds. These
studies consistently find that the general public gives priority to children.
Perhaps surprisingly, all age groups-young, old, and in between-show the
same preference for child safety. These studies serve two important roles. First,
they show that even non-parents value children more than adults. Second, these
studies suggest that giving priority to children is widely viewed as a legitimate
goal of government.
Although most bioethics studies do not attempt to estimate the magnitude
of subjects' age-based preferences, the few that do support the estimates
derived from stated-preference studies. One Swedish study asked adults to
choose between traffic-safety programs that had different effects on different
age groups.1os By altering the number of people saved from each age group, the
researchers were able to estimate the relative value that subjects put on saving
people in one age group over another. o0 Subjects valued 5- to 15-year-old
pedestrians 50% higher than 25- to 35-year-old pedestrians, and 94% higher
than 45- to 55-year-old pedestrians. o7 Men and women, parents and non-
parents, and subjects both over and under fifty-seven all favored the same basic
ranking. os Another Swedish study found similar results when people were
asked about traffic and fire hazards: subjects implicitly indicated that saving
one 5- to 15-year-old was equivalent to saving 1.4 35- to 45-year-olds, or 3.3
65- to 75-year-olds.109 A recent study in the U.S. found even more extreme
results; American subjects were indifferent between programs that saved one
ten-year-old and ten sixty-year-olds.110 This pattern held for programs that
prevented illnesses rather than fatalities, and held even for older subjects.
Many more studies find a child premium without attempting to quantify it.
For example, when British subjects were asked to distribute an unidentified
life-saving treatment, they chose to give priority to five-year-olds first.1 12 The
105. Olof Johansson-Stenman & Peter Martinsson, Are Some Lives More Valuable? An
Ethical Preferences Approach, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 739, 744 (2008).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 744, 746, 747.
108. Id. at 746.
109. Fredrik Carlsson et al., Preferences for Lives, Injuries, and Age: A Stated Preference
Survey, 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1814, 1814 (2010).
110. Daniel Eisenberg et al., Valuing Health at Different Ages: Evidence from a Nationally
Representative Survey in the US, 9 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y 149, 149, 152-53 (2011).
111. Id. at 152 (finding that 64% of older subjects without children under eighteen chose to
save 100 ten-year-olds over 1000 sixty-year-olds).
112. Aki Tsuchiya et al., Measuring People's Preferences Regarding Ageism in Health, 57
Soc. SC. & MED. 687, 693 tbl.4 (2003).
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same pattern appeared for both students and adults from the U.S. who were
asked to allocate scarce flu vaccines.113 Other studies confirm this pattern. 14
The British study mentioned above also contained a qualitative follow-up
in which people were asked to explain their rankings. 115 They offered four
touchstones, three of which support the child premium. First, favor those who
have lived less life.1 16 Second, favor those who have the greatest capacity to
benefit.l17 Third, favor those who will produce the greatest benefit to society.
Fourth, favor those with family responsibilities. 19 The most common
explanation was that allocations should favor those who had lived less life. 1 20
This obviously favors children. The capacity to benefit from the intervention
also seems to favor the young, at least if there are no special reasons to think
that the young would have a lower survival rate or some other complication
from the intervention. Allocating resources based on the benefits to society is
the only factor that does not appear to favor children; it favors young adults.
Although both young adults and children have many productive years in front
of them,121 society has already invested in young adults to prepare them to be
productive. Lastly, people cited family responsibilities. 12 2 This suggests that
even when making allocation decisions between adults, child well-being is a
powerful touchstone.
Federal vaccine priority plans also favor children. The Department of
Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security have
jointly developed a vaccine priority system that allocates vaccines to essential
113. Meng Li et al., How Do People Value Life?, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 163 (2005).
114. One such study presented people with detailed patient vignettes and asked them to
allocate scarce liver transplants; the greatest point of agreement was that the nine month old should
receive one of the livers. James Neuberger et. al., Assessing Priorities for Allocation of Donor Liver
Grafts, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 172, 172-73 (1998). The next greatest point of agreement was that the mother
of a very young child should receive a liver. Id.; see also Paul Dolan et al., QAL Y Maximisation and
People s Preferences: A Methodological Review of the Literature, 14 HEALTH ECON. 197, 203 (2005)
[hereinafter Dolan, QALY Maximisation] (reporting that most studies find that people give priority to
patients with dependents). Another study replicated these results in cases where the subjects were
allowed to deliberate with one another before making a choice; the greatest consensus was reached on
the proposition that children should get priority over adults. Paul Dolan et al., Effect of Discussion and
Deliberation on the Public's Views of Priority Setting in Health Care: Focus Group Study, 318 BRIT.
MED. J. 916, 918 (1999).






121. Note that age is likely to be the only relevant variable in determining a person's
productivity because other studies suggest that people refuse to base allocation decisions on income or
occupation (each of which might arguably be a proxy for the benefits that the patient provides to
society). Colette J. Browning & Shane A. Thomas, Community Values and Preferences in
Transplantation Organ Allocation Decisions, 52 Soc. SCl. & MED. 853, 857 tbl.1 (2001) (reporting that





workers first, and then to pregnant women, children zero to two, children three
to eighteen, persons sixty-five or older, then to the rest of the population.123
Similarly, a large-scale collaboration between academics and community
members in Minnesota sought to design a plan to allocate scarce vaccines
during a flu pandemic.124 The resulting guidelines gave priority to people based
on a combination of their risk of dying and the effectiveness of the vaccine.125
Within each of these risk/effectiveness groups, children under eighteen
received priority. 126
Some of these allocation decisions can be explained without recourse to
the idea of a child premium. Children may have a lesser capacity to protect
themselves from adverse health outcomes, and therefore are less responsible for
those outcomes. 12 7 Subjects may be partially responding to differences in
culpability or moral hazard concerns when they allocate livers, vaccines, and
safety-project funds to children. However, it is unlikely that culpability and
moral hazard concerns fully explain these patterns. When subjects were asked
to rank the importance of various criteria for allocating livers to adults, they
were attentive to whether the donee's liver disease was naturally occurring or
the result of alcoholism, but they indicated that age was a more important
factor. 12 8 Similarly, plans designed to distribute vaccines during flu pandemics
favor children even though adults may not be able to do much to avoid
infection.
C. The Child Premium vs. Life-Years
The reader might rightly ask why agencies should use a child premium as
opposed to life-years. Several studies suggested that subjects preferred a linear
ranking of ages, and people offered explanations that would be consistent with
a focus on life-years.129 A closer look at the evidence, however, shows that
people's preferences for risk-wealth tradeoffs are not a clean function of life-
years, regardless of whether people are making those tradeoffs for themselves
or their children.
123. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE
ON ALLOCATING AND TARGETING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE (2007) [hereinafter PANDEMIC FLU
GUIDANCE], http://www.flu.gov/images/reports/PI%20vaccine%20allocation%20guidance.pdf. For a
full list of state pandemic flu plans, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE PANDEMIC
PLANS http://www.flu.gov/professional/states/stateplans.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
124. DOROTHY E. VAWTER ET AL., FOR THE GOOD OF Us ALL: ETHICALLY RATIONING
HEALTH RESOURCES IN MINNESOTA IN A SEVERE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 2 (2010),
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/ethics/ethics.pdf.
125. Id. at 47. Certain essential workers were also given elevated priority. Id.
126. Id. at 47, 61.
127. Scott, supra note 42, at 547.
128. Julie Ratcliffe, Public Preferences for the Allocation of Donor Liver Grafts for
Transplantation, 9 HEALTH ECON. 137, 144-45 (2000).
129. See supra Section I.B.
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Evidence that adult preferences for their own risk reductions follow a life-
years approach is mixed at best.' 30 Evidence from the labor market suggests
that the relationship between WTP and age follows a flattened inverted "U"
shape. WTP increases gradually between eighteen and forty, and then decreases
gradually after about forty or fifty. Stated-preference studies are consistent
with this general pattern.132 Although older people have fewer life-years left,
they tend to value those remaining life-years more. This should not be a
surprise. It results from both emotional reactions to mortality (you may not
appreciate what you have until you realize that you might lose it), and rational
reactions to it (because you cannot take your money with you, WTP increases
along with the probability of death in the near future).133
In the context of child risk reductions, there is only meager evidence that
parental preferences track life-years. The three studies that estimated child
premiums for children of different ages found the same trend: Parents are
willing to pay most to reduce risks faced by younger children, and their WTP
decreases with the age of the child. In one study, the VSL for a four-year-old
was $14 million, while the VSL for a seventeen-year-old was $5.2 million.13 4
The VSLs for children of other ages ranged between these two extremes.' 3 5
Two earlier studies confirm this trend.13 6 There are two reasons that this trend
does not show that parents use life-years to value their children's safety. First,
these WTP figures simply do not line up with life-years. Second, none of the
studies asked parents to make allocation decisions between their children.
The above trend is not consistent with a life-years approach. A five-year-
old has 74 life-years left, and a fifteen-year-old has 64 life-years left. 37 We
might then expect the five-year-old to be valued at 74/64 = 1.16x the value of
the 15-year-old. If we discount future life years at three percent, the five-year-
old would be valued 1.05x higher. The differences in WTP, however, are much
more dramatic.' 38 A life-years approach cannot explain this pattern.
130. Lisa A. Robinson et al., Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks, 7 J.
HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 11-12 (2010) (collecting studies).
131. Jospeh E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Differences in the Value of Statistical Life:
Revealed Preference Evidence, 1 REv. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 241, 241-260 (2007).
132. Hammitt & Haninger, supra note 73, at 60-61 (reporting that adults' VSL peaked
between ages forty and forty-five).
133. Ariel Porat & Avraham Tabbach, Willingness to Pay, Death, Wealth, and Damages, 13
AM. L. & ECON. REv. 45, 45-49 (2011) (arguing that this overinvestment in risk reduction when people
face a risk of death undermines the use of WTP to measure overall welfare).
134. Blomquist et al., supra note 82, at 420.
135. Id.
136. Agee & Crocker, supra note 53, at 244 (finding a 5-fold premium for children less than
one-year-old, a 1.7-fold premium for seven- to ten-year-old children, and no premium for fourteen- to
seventeen-year-olds); Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at I165.
137. Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables 2007, 59 National Vital Statistics Reports 1, 2
(2011).
138. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 110, at 153 (noting that the valuation of ten-year-olds
relative to sixty-year-olds is at least 10:1 for most respondents even though a life-years approach would




More importantly, these studies did not ask parents about multiple
children. Each asked parents to make risk-wealth tradeoffs for one target
child.139 This masks the potential equity concerns that might be more salient if
parents were valuing multiple children at once. It is likely that parents would
weigh the interests of all of their children roughly equally. This preference for
equal treatment is a standard pattern in bequests. People tend to leave equal
amounts to all of their children. 14 0 Although bequests are a much different
context, they offer at least some reason to doubt that parents will be willing to
pay more for equivalent risk reductions for younger children.
Societal preferences are also in tension with treating children differently
based on their age. One study asked British adults to allocate a scarce life-
saving treatment to either an eight-year-old or a two-year-old. 14 1 Forty six
percent of respondents refused to rank the two, and another 47% said that the
decision was "difficult."1 4 2 Ultimately, a narrow margin favored the eight-year-
old, because the eight-year-old was more aware and more of a person, and her
parents might be more invested in her.14 3 Other studies confirm this resistance
to ranking children and the tendency for people to favor older children.144 The
same pattern exists in the Federal vaccine distribution plan, except that the
federal plan splits children into two groups: ages zero to two and ages three to
I8.145 Within these groups, it does not give priority based on age.146 Nor does it
use age to allocate vaccines among 19- to 64-year-olds or among those sixty-
five and older.147 This suggests that societal preferences at most categorize
people into rough age groups and do not support using life-years to allocate
resources within these groups.
Life-years also do a poor job of reflecting preferences for allocating
resources between adults and children. Although life-years contain an implicit
child premium (because saving a child normally saves more life-years than
saving an adult), it appears to be lower than the premium suggested by the
studies in Part I. Saving a five-year-old yields about seventy-four life-years,
139. See Agee & Crocker, supra note 53, at 237; Blomquist et al., supra note 82, at 414;
Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1151.
140. Kathleen McGarry, Inter Vivos Transfers and Intended Bequests, 73 J. PUB. ECON. 321,
321-51 (1999).
141. Michael Charny et al., Choosing Who Shall Not Be Treated in the NHS, 28 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 1331, 1334 (1989).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1337.
144. Jan Busschbach, The Utility of Health at Different Stages in Life, 37 SOc. SCl. & MED.
153, 154-56 (1993) (reporting indirect evidence that people valued the health of a ten-year-old more
highly than the health of a five-year-old); Erik Nord et al., Maximizing Health Benefits vs
Egalitarianism, 41 SOc. SC. & MED. 1429, 1433 (1995) (finding that only 1% of subjects gave a scarce
organ to an infant over a young child, and 52% found the decision very difficult).
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while saving a thirty-five-year-old saves about forty-five life years.148 If these
life-years are discounted at 3%, then valuing regulatory benefits using life-
years would be roughly equivalent to a 21% child premium. Of course, this
figure depends on the particular ages chosen. For a thirty-year-old parent of a
five-year-old, the implicit premium is 15%; for a forty-year-old parent of a
five-year-old, the implicit premium is 28%. These implicit child premiums
appear to be too low. Recall that the median child premium from the studies in
Section L.A was 80%. This discrepancy makes sense. The concept of life-years
accounts for the fact that children have more life years ahead of them than
adults. But people may also care about other factors as well, like the fact that
children have not had their "fair innings" yet.149 I will discuss these fair innings
arguments in more detail below.15 0 For now it is sufficient to note that life years
are not a good proxy for adults' risk-preferences for themselves or their
children and at best capture only part of the child premium.
II. Objections
This Part addresses three sets of objections to the child premium. It first
addresses technical objections about the strength and sufficiency of the
evidence undergirding the child premium. It then addresses welfarist objections
about whether the preferences that undergird the child premium are
misinformed or otherwise do not provide a good guide to the welfare effects of
childhood risk-reductions. Finally it addresses two non-welfarist normative
objections.
A. Technical Objections
The child premium is, at first glance, vulnerable to three technical
objections. First, there are perhaps too few studies that have examined the child
premium to make solid conclusions from this body of research. Second, CBA
normally excludes altruism. Third, much of the evidence for the child premium
comes from stated-preference studies, which have a host of known
methodological problems.
1. Insufficient Evidence
The evidence described in Part I goes a long way toward advocating a
child premium. To see why, it will be useful to compare the above evidence
with the evidence that recently motivated the EPA to recommend a cancer
premium.
148. Arias, supra note 137, at 2.
149. Tsuchiya et al., supra note 112, at 694.
150. See infra notes 289-292 and accompanying text.
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In 2010, the EPA proposed adopting a 50% cancer premium.i1t This
number was derived from nine stated-preference studies that compared WTP
figures for cancer and non-cancer risks.152 Although four of these studies found
no cancer premium, five found evidence of a cancer premium.153 The EPA
settled on a 50% figure because this was close to the average reported cancer
premium of 52% across the nine studies.1 54 This proposal would align U.S.
policy with that of the U.K. and the E.U. The U.K. uses a 100% cancer
premium and the European Commission has recommended a 50% cancer
premium. 155
The child premium has more empirical support than the cancer premium.
The studies finding a child premium are more methodologically diverse (both
stated and revealed-preference studies) and more uniformly supportive (all
published studies found a child premium) than the studies that support a cancer
premium. Using the cancer premium as a guide, it would appear that agencies
should embrace the child premium. Additionally, the evidence in favor of the
child premium goes well beyond stated and revealed-preference studies, and
stems from bioethics studies and vaccine response plans as well.
2. Altruism and Double Counting
Stated and revealed-preference studies gather data on the subject's WTP
to avoid a certain risk. These studies do not gather data on how much others
might be willing to pay to reduce the subject's risk. If multiple people are
willing to pay to reduce a subject's risk, then reducing that risk will satisfy all
of their preferences and thereby improve all of their welfare. 56 One might
therefore think that CBA should add altruistic WTP measures to its existing
individual WTP measures. However, standard CBA excludes altruistic
preferences.157
151. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., VALUING MORTALITY RISK,
REDUCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POL'Y: A WHITE PAPER 26 (Draft 2010) [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER].
152. Id. at 25 n.14.
153. Id. at 23-24. Simply counting the studies, however, is slightly misleading. One of the
studies that did not find a cancer premium contained a clear methodological limitation that biased it
against finding such premiums. Id. (discussing Wesley A. Magat et al., A Reference Lottery Metric for
Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118 (1996), which failed to control for the latency period of cancer).
Another one was since revised to find mixed support-rather than no support-for a cancer premium.
Wiktor Adamowicz et al., Valuation of Cancer and Microbial Disease Risk Reductions in Municipal
Drinking Water: An Analysis of Risk Context Using Multiple Valuation Methods, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 213, 213 (2011); WHITE PAPER, supra note 151, at 25 n.14 (citing an earlier working paper
version of Adamowicz et al.).
154. WHITE PAPER, supra note 151, at 25.
155. Id. at 21.
156. This presumes a preference-based account of welfare.
157. Kevin Brady, The Value of Human Life: A Case for Altruism, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 541,
541 (2008).
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The main argument against incorporating altruism into CBA turns on the
distinction between "non-paternalistic" and "paternalistic" altruists.'58 Non-
paternalistic altruists prefer to increase others' welfare, and assume that others
can be trusted to maximize their own welfare.'5 9 If this assumption holds, then
the non-paternalistic altruist is always better off by giving the subject additional
money rather than additional safety. The subject will, of course, benefit either
way, but she will benefit more if she is allowed to choose her optimal mix of
safety and other goods. Thus, non-paternalistic altruists would never want to
intrude on the subject's risk-wealth tradeoff. A paternalistic altruist, on the
other hand, would perhaps value the subject's safety more than the subject
values her own safety.'60 Thus, a paternalistic altruist would intrude on the
subject's risk-wealth trade-off, and would want her WTP added to the subject's
WTP for a given risk reduction. Although CBA should ignore non-paternalistic
altruism, it should incorporate paternalistic altruism. There is widespread
consensus on this point: economists, the OMB, and current U.K. regulatory
guidelines all recommend including paternalistic altruism in CBA.161
Although the theoretical case for incorporating paternalistic altruism into
CBA is strong, agencies currently ignore it.162 The most likely explanation is
that measuring such altruism would be costly, and regulators may doubt that
the added precision would be worth that cost. Regulators may also doubt their
capacity to disentangle non-patemalistic and paternalistic preferences using
existing research.
Although these pragmatic arguments suggest that agencies can potentially
ignore some adult-adult altruism, they do not apply to parent-child altruism.
Parent-child altruism is likely to be extremely common and exceptionally
strong. Many studies already measure parents' WTP to protect their children.
Most importantly, there is no need to disentangle paternalistic and non-
paternalistic altruism in the parent-child context. To the extent that parental
altruism is paternalistic, agencies should incorporate it into CBA. But agencies
should also incorporate a parent's non-paternalistic altruism. CBA ignores non-
paternalistic altruism because these altruists assume that others can be trusted
to maximize their own welfare, and thus they would not want to intrude on




161. Hoffmann, supra note 37, at 219 (noting the consensus among economists that only
paternalistic altruism should enter cost-benefit analysis); OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 22
(using the terms "general altruism" and "selective altruism" to refer to non-paternalistic and paternalistic
altruism respectively, and recommending that agencies include selective altruism in CBA); HM
TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 62 (2011)
[hereinafter THE GREEN BOOK] ("In the UK, the main measure of VPF [(value of a prevented fatality)]
incorporates the 'extra' value placed on relatives and friends, and any further value placed by society on
avoiding the premature death of individuals.").




others' risk-wealth tradeoffs. However, this assumption doesn't hold for
children; children lack the maturity and knowledge to make the necessary
decisions. A parent's non-paternalistic altruism can serve as the proxy for the
child's risk-welfare tradeoffs, and a parent's paternalistic altruism can augment
this preference. Thus, there is no need to disentangle paternalistic and non-
paternalistic altruism in the parent-child context.' 63
3. Methodological Objections to Stated-Preference Studies
Six of the nine studies supporting the child premium relied on
hypothetical stated preferences. Although there are a number of known
weaknesses with such stated-preference studies, these weaknesses are all
mitigated in the context of the child premium. Given that agencies currently use
stated-preference studies to measure the VSL and the benefits attributable to
reducing injuries, bronchitis, upper and lower respiratory symptoms, asthma,
and increasing visibility,'6 using stated-preference studies to measure the child
premium should be uncontroversial.
This Section addresses six standard critiques of stated-preference
studies. 16 Each of these critiques is much less potent when researchers are
seeking to ascertain the ratio of two WTP measures given by the same subject.
First, people may systematically inflate their WTP in response to
hypothetical questions because they do not feel the sting of actually paying the
money.166 It is not clear that this is always a substantial concern. Hypothetical
WTP is correlated with income,167 and several studies find no statistically
significant differences between WTP estimates based on actual behavior and
163. Each parent may have a different estimate of what is in the child's interest, and a
different degree of paternalistic altruism. This would not undermine the child premium. The revealed
preference studies discussed in Section I.B probably reflect a negotiated compromise between differing
attitudes toward childhood risks. For reasons discussed in Section LA, agencies should respect these
negotiated parental preferences. The possibility that parents will diverge in their WTP, however, could
affect the proper interpretation of stated-preference studies, which usually solicit WTP information from
only one parent. Several of these studies examined whether fathers were willing to pay a different
amount than mothers and yielded mixed results. See Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1163 n.19
(finding racial differences in WTP for self and child but no racial differences in the ratio of the two
WTP estimates). Compare Blomquist et al., supra note 82, at 418, 421 tbl.5 (finding that the parents'
sex did not affect WTP estimates), with Hammitt & Haninger, supra note 73, at 73 tbl.3 (finding that
fathers' WTP was lower than mothers' WTP for both themselves and their children but not reporting
whether this affected the ratio of WTP for self and WTP for the child), and Hammitt & Haninger, supra
note 92, at 1172 tbl.1 (same). If parents exhibit greatly divergent child premiums, agencies should adjust
the results of stated-preferences studies to estimate the actual household WTP.
164. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
165. For general discussions of these critiques, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note
17, at 153-78; ADLER &POSNER, supra note 15, at 124-53, 166-73.
166. Blumenschein et al., supra note 62, at 114-16.
167. See James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, The Income Elasticity of the Value per
Statistical Life: Transferring Estimates Between High and Low Income Populations, 2 J. BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2011) (discussing correlation between income and VSL).
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hypothetical stated-preference studies.168 But even if subjects are too profligate,
they are likely to be profligate for both themselves and their children. As long
as both WTP figures are inflated, the ratio between them will remain relatively
stable.
Second, subjects often exhibit a social desirability response bias, whereby
they respond in ways that make them look good, rather than in ways that reveal
their true preferences. 169 "Good" parents protect their children. Therefore, the
social desirability response bias might inflate WTP estimates for children and
thereby inflate the child premium. Although this is a theoretical concern, the
child premium derived from stated-preference studies is similar to the child
premium derived from actual real-world purchase decisions. 70 This suggests
that subjects in the relevant stated-preference studies were not overly
influenced by a desire to present themselves to the researchers as good parents.
Third, stated-preference studies are sometimes plagued by protest
responses.171 When people are asked how much they are willing to pay for
cleaner air around the Grand Canyon, for example, many might say that they
would pay an infinite amount or refuse to answer the question. 17 At best, this
reduces the number of usable responses and biases the ultimate WTP figures.
At worst, this indicates that the entire enterprise of asking people to price clean
air is senseless. 73 We might expect parents to offer protest responses when
asked to make tradeoffs between wealth and child safety. But that has not been
the case. Research into parents' WTP has consistently used realistic scenarios
that reflect the everyday tradeoffs like buying pesticide-free food.174 These
studies have produced very few protest responses. 175
Fourth, although people are willing to pay more for a larger risk reduction,
they are not sensitive enough to the scope of additional risk reductions. 176 For
example, if people are willing to pay $100 to reduce a risk by 1 in 1,000, they
might only be willing to pay $160 to reduce that risk by 5 in 1,000.177 But
again, as long as parents are insensitive to scope for both themselves and their
168. See, e.g., Jahn K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the Value of
Statistical Life, 73 S. ECON. J. 659, 659 (2007) (comparing WTP implied by actual seatbelt use with
WTP estimates from hypothetical questions).
169. For a brief overview of this phenomenon, see Donna M. Randall & Maria F. Fernandes,
The Social Desirability Response Bias in Ethics Research, 10 J. Bus. ETHICs 805, 805-06 (1991).
170. See supra Section L.A.
171. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 133.
172. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLNG, supra note 17, at 161-64.
173. Id. People may feel that it is morally inappropriate to value some goods with money. Id.
at 162.
174. Hammitt & Haninger, supra note 73, at 65.
175. See id. at 67.
176. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 163.
177. See Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health
Status? Evidence from the US and Canada, 48 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 769, 783 (2004).
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children, then the ratio of their WTP measures will be less biased by scope
insensitivity than the WTP measures themselves.
Fifth, subjects give different responses depending on the framing of the
question. The most important of these framing issues is the difference between
WTP and willingness to accept (WTA). WTA questions give the subject a
right to be free from a risk, and then ask subjects to report the amount of money
that they would require to relinquish that right.179 WTP questions implicitly
deny that the subject has a right to be free from risk and then ask about the
subject's willingness to purchase risk reductions. 80 In the context of publically
provided goods like protection from environmental harms, WTA estimates are
about ten times higher than WTP estimates. Survey responses are also
sensitive to whether the questions present probabilities in the form of a
percentage or a frequency and their particular wording.182 These framing
effects present a challenge for incorporating the results of stated-preference
studies into CBA. But these challenges are far smaller in the context of a child
premium. As long as the questions about parental and child risk are similarly
framed, it is likely that those frames will at least bias the result in the same
direction for both parent and child risk reductions. If so, then at a minimum,
framing effects should have less effect on the child premiums than on the
myriad existing agency estimates derived from stated-preference studies.
Sixth, wealth effects may bias the results of both stated and revealed-
preference studies. Richer people can afford to pay more for risk reductions, 183
and they do.' 84 This is arguably a problem because it is not clear that equivalent
risk reductions affect the welfare of the rich and poor differently. Wealth
effects, however, should not affect the child premium. One study confirmed
this prediction: As households face greater budget constraints, WTP for risk
reductions decreases, but the ratio of WTP to reduce the parents' and children's
risk remains constant.18 1
Although the child premium faces methodological objections, none of
these objections ultimately undermines the child premium. If anything, the
178. There is an ongoing debate about whether to use WTP or WTA to measure the benefits of
a regulation. Despite this unresolved debate, agencies consistently use WTP. McGarity, supra note 3, at
67-69; ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 166-73.
179. McGarity, supra note 3, at 67-69.
180. Id.
181. John Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENv.
EcON. & MGMT. 426, 433 (2002).
182. See, e.g., Nicholas Scurich & Richard John, The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk
Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 83, 83-85 (2012).
183. Wealthier people can also afford to hold out for more money, in the case of willingness to
accept measures.
184. Hammitt & Robinson, supra note 167, at 7.
185. See Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1168 tbl.7 (showing decreased WTP for both
parent and child safety as number of children in the household rises).
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child premium is built on a more solid foundation than many existing benefits
estimates that agencies routinely use in CBA.
B. Welfarist Objections: Heuristics, Biases, and Preference Laundering
Identifying a premium is only the first step in an argument that
policymakers should incorporate that premium into CBA. The second step1 86 is
to ascertain whether the preferences that undergird the premium are well-
informed. Generally, policymakers should only incorporate well-informed
premiums into their analyses and should ignore premiums that are rooted in
biases.187 This section outlines a series of potential biases and then argues that
none of them drive the child premium. It also argues that the child premium
passes a "laundering" test recently proposed by Matthew Adler and Eric Posner
in an effort to exclude welfare-irrelevant preferences from CBA.
1. Overview of Important Biases
Many preferences, especially those surrounding risk, are likely to be the
result of various biases. People may overestimate the relevant probabilities due
to the availability heuristic or the affect heuristic, or they may underestimate
the relevant probabilities due to overoptimism.' 89 Even if people accurately
predict the relevant probabilities, they may exhibit probability neglect.190
Affective forecasting errors and self-other decision-making dynamics may be
relevant as well. None of these biases, however, undermines the child premium.
186. These steps are presented in order (first, second . .. ) for convenience only. There is no
logical necessity to proceed through the analyses in any particular order. Further, I do not discuss other
potential steps because they are not very relevant to the child premium. A third step might be for
policymakers to examine whether a set of preferences has negative externalities before incorporating it
into CBA. This concern is not relevant to the child premium because children, if anything, create
positive externalities. Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 194, 200 (1999) (arguing that children create positive externalities by, for
example, financing programs like Social Security and giving nations the means to pay back previously
incurred debt); Ronald Lee & Tim Miller, Population Policy and Externalities to Childbearing, 510
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 17, 17 (1990) (finding "large positive externalities"); S. Philip
Morgan & Rosalind Berkowitz King, Why Have Children in the 21st Century? Biological
Predisposition, Social Coercion, Rational Choice, 17 EUR. J. POPULATION. 3, 15 (2001) ("[Olver his or
her lifetime a child would contribute over $100,000 (in 1985 dollars) more to public coffers than they
extract."). A fourth step might be to assess whether the child premium is objectively bad. Some
commentators have suggested that objectively bad preferences-such as racism-should be excluded
from welfarist policy analyses. Compare ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 138-40 (arguing that
objectively bad preferences should be ignored), with Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 418-31 (2002) (arguing that all preferences should count).
187. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 127-28.
188. Id. at 35-37.
189. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
203-04 (2006).
190. Ellen Peters et al., The Functions of Affect in Health Communications and in the




i. The Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic was a mainstay of early behavioral law and
economics scholarship.'91 It refers to the tendency for people to judge the
probability of an event by how easy it is to recall the occurrence of other events
of that type.192 For example, it is much easier to think of words that end in
"-ing" than to think of words with "n" as the second to last letter.' 9 3
Accordingly, people judge that "-ing" words are much more common even
though all words ending in "-ing" (and many others) have "n" as the second to
last letter.194 Relatedly, if the media often covers dramatic events like tornados,
then people will be able to recall instances of tornados quite easily, and
therefore they might drastically overestimate the likelihood of dying in a
tornado.195
The availability heuristic could plausibly influence probability judgments
about the risks of various harms to children. Media outlets may provide more
coverage to child tragedies than adult tragedies. If so, people may overestimate
childhood risks relative to adult risks.
ii. The Affect Heuristic
The affect heuristic refers to the tendency for people to make judgments-
including probability judgments-based on their immediate emotional response
to a stimulus. In one study, toxicologists gave "quick intuitive ratings" from
"bad" to "good" of various chemicals.197 They were then asked to judge the risk
posed by exposure to very small amounts of the chemicals (defined as 1/100th
of the dose that regulatory agencies would be concerned about).198 Because all
of the risks were two orders of magnitude below the level that regulatory
agencies defined as safe, one would suspect that expert toxicologists would
report that the risks were uniformly low. Instead, risk ratings were highly
correlated with the quick intuitive rating.199 This study suggests that probability
191. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 15.18-19 (1998).
192. Id. at 1477.
193. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REv. 293, 295 (1983).
194. Id.
195. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 106-07 (Ragnar E. Lfstedt ed., 2000); Susan
Cutter, The Vulnerability ofScience and the Science of Vulnerability, 93 ANNALS ASsoc. AM. GEOG. 1,
2 (2003).
196. Cutter, supra note 195, at 2 (defining the affect heuristic as a "simplifying rule" where
"activities or technologies that are disliked or feared (an emotional response) influence both the
perception of the risk (high) and the perceptions of the benefits of that technology or activity (low).").
197. Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect,
Reason, Risk and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 315-16 (2004).
198. Id. at 316.
199. Id.
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judgments are influenced by the affect attached to any given outcome. Affect-
rich outcomes like being exposed to a dangerous chemical are likely to have a
greater effect on probability judgments than affect-poor outcomes like taking
an aspirin.
The affect heuristic could plausibly influence probability judgments about
the risks of various harms to children. Because such harms are extraordinarily
affect-rich, people may overestimate the relevant probabilities.
iii. Overoptimism
"[P]eople have a pervasive tendency to believe they are better than others
in a multitude of ways and that life's negative events are less likely to befall
them than their peers." 200 Compared to others, people think that they are less to
experience heart attacks,201 heart disease,202 strokes, 203  skin cancer,204
alcoholism,205 and car accidents.206 This overoptimism207 is especially
pronounced when people think they have more control over whether the
negative event occurs.208
Overoptimism has an ambiguous effect on the child premium.
Overoptimism could inflate the child premium if parents felt that they had a
relatively large degree of control over the risks that they faced, but had a
relatively small degree of control over the risks that their children faced. In
such situations, overoptimism would lead parents to underestimate their own
risks, which would inflate the child premium. But this control-asymmetry is
unlikely to affect all risks. Parents are unlikely to have asymmetric perceptions
of control for cancer or car accidents,209 but this pattern is more plausible for
other risks such as the risk of breaking an arm.
200. John R. Chambers & Paul D. Windschitl, Biases in Social Comparative Judgments: The
Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative Optimism Effects, 130 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 813, 813 (2004).
201. Neil Weinstein & William Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing
Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132, 134 (1995).
202. Id. at 135.
203. Matthew W. Kreuter & Victor J. Strecher, Changing Inaccurate Perceptions of Health
Risk: Results from a Randomized Trial, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 56, 60 (1995).
204. Thomas A. Morton & Julie M. Duck, Communication and Health Beliefs: Mass and
Interpersonal Influences on Perceptions ofRisk to Selfand Others, 28 COMM. REs. 602, 610-11 (2001).
205. Weinstein & Klein, supra note 201, at 135.
206. Id. at 134.
207. "Overoptimism" is an umbrella term that covers several plausibly distinct biases. For an
overview, see David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessments, 5 PSYCHOL. Sci. PuB. INT. 69 (2004).
208. Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306, 311 (1999); Chambers & Windschitl, supra note 200, at 815-16;
Dunning et al., supra note 207, at 80; N.C. Higgins et al., The Controllability of Negative Life
Experiences Mediates Unrealistic Optimism, 42 Soc. INDICATORS REs. 299, 319 (1997).






Even if peoples' probability estimates are reasonably accurate, they might
nonetheless exhibit probability neglect.210 When faced with an affect-rich
outcome, people often depart from expected utility theory and discount the
importance of the relevant probabilities.211 In one study, subjects were given
the opportunity to win a prize by drawing a red jellybean out of a transparent
bowl that contained both red and white jellybeans.212 They could draw either
from a bowl containing one red jellybean and nine white jellybeans (resulting
in a 10% chance or winning) or a bowl containing seven red jellybeans and
ninety-three white jellybeans (resulting in a 7% chance of winning). 213 Many
subjects knowingly made non-optimal choices and made comments like: "I
picked the ones with the more red jelly beans because it looked like there were
more ways to get a winner, even though I knew there were also more whites,
and that the percents were against me." 214 Relatedly, affect-rich outcomes also
cause people to focus disproportionately on the mere possibility rather than on
the numeric probability of the outcome.215 In one illuminating study, subjects
were willing to pay about $20 to avoid a painful electric shock with
certainty.216 Yet they were radically insensitive to the probability that the shock
would occur; the data suggest that they would be willing to pay only $3 to
reduce the probability of the shock from 99% to 1%.217 When subjects were
facing a less emotionally salient risk-the loss of $20-they responded in ways
that were much more consistent with expected utility theory.218
Probability neglect could plausibly influence probability judgments about
the risks of various harms to children. Again, it is likely that harms to children
are very affect-rich. Because these events are so salient, people may react to the
mere possibility of such harms rather than weighing their probabilities.
210. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 121, 122 (2003) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of fears about terrorism).
211. Id.
212. Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational
Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
819, 820-21 (1994).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 823.
215. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1119, 1142 (2002)
(reviewing PAUL SLOVic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Ragnar E. L6fstedt ed., 2000)) (reporting that
subjects did not adjust their WTP for a tenfold change in the probability of getting cancer when that
cancer would be accompanied by "gruesome" and "painful" symptoms, while subjects were sensitive to
a ten-fold change in the probability of getting cancer when it was not described in such affect-rich
terms).
216. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks, 12
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v. Hedonic Adaptation and Affective Forecasting
Legal literature has increasingly explored the implications of the
psychology of happiness.219 This research has yielded two major findings. First,
people have psychological immune systems 220 that prevent major life traumas
from having lasting effects on their happiness.221 This tendency to adapt is
referred to as hedonic adaptation. 222 Second, people do not understand that they
have these immune systems and thus do not predict that they would adapt to
major life events.223 People erroneously predict that negative life events such as
kidney disease,224 colostomy,225 and breast cancer226 will drastically lower their
quality of life.227 This is referred to as an affective forecasting error.228
These phenomena might inflate the child premium. If parents predict that
the death of their child will cause them serious life-long suffering, and if that
prediction is erroneous, then parents might overvalue childhood risk reductions.
It is unclear, however, that parents are making any predictive errors. Hedonic
adaptation is common but not universal; people rarely adapt to chronic pain.229
Living with the death of a child may be akin to living with a chronic
condition. 2 30 More importantly, under a preference-based account of welfare,
219. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745, 746 (2007); John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037, 1038 (2009); John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1516, 1516 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. at S157, S160, S176 (2008); Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and
Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't Be (Just) About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. Sl95, S206
(2008).
220. See generally Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998).
221. See, e.g., Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study
Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 7 (2005) (finding that
hemodialysis patients hedonically adapt to their condition).
222. Id. at 3.
223. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351, 1353 (2007).
224. See David L. Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as
Perceived by the General Public, 31 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697, 702 (1978).
225. See Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. DECISION
MAKING 58, 65 (1990).
226. See Kerry A. Wilson et al., Perception of Quality of Life by Patients, Partners and
Treating Physicians, 9 QUALITY LIFE RES. 1041, 1045 (2000) (finding that physicians underestimate
quality of life for patients with breast cancer).
227. See Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and
Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57, S57 (2005) (noting that people may
"mispredict the impact that circumstances will have on their well-being and quality of life").
228. Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 649, 649 (2006).
229. Sunstein, supra note 219, at S157.
230. There is some evidence that parents adapt to the death of their children, but the authors
note that their evidence is only preliminary. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death,
Happiness, and the Calculation of Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEGAL STUDIES S217, S229 (2008)




the hedonic impacts of an event do not exhaust its welfare effects. Most parents
have extraordinarily strong preferences that their children flourish. Thus, even
if parents fully adapt hedonically to the death of a child, it is unclear how much
impact this should have on an assessment of its overall welfare effects.
vi. Deciding for Others
There is a growing body of evidence that people systematically alter the
way they make decisions when they are making a decision for others. When
deciding for others, people focus only on the most salient variables and
downplay the importance of other considerations. 2 3 1 This heuristic applies to a
host of decisions and deciders. It affects doctors' recommendations, 2 32 parents'
23323decisions to vaccinate their child, people's investment decisions for others,2 34
and even simple choices like deciding what snacks to purchase for another
235
person.
These heuristics might bias a parent's WTP to protect her child. Two
relevant studies addressed self-other decision-making dynamics in the context
of health care. Each presented subjects with a tradeoff between a mortality risk
236and a morbidity risk. For example, subjects in one study had to choose
between a medical treatment with a 20% mortality rate and a medical treatment
with a 16% mortality rate but a 4% chance of causing non-fatal side effects
such as "intermittent bowel obstruction." 2 37 When deciding for others (as
compared to themselves), more subjects choose the treatment with a lower
mortality risk.2 38 This might suggest that when parents make risk-wealth
tradeoffs for their children, they focus disproportionately on the most salient
child); id. at S244 (noting the novelty of their methodology and concluding that "we believe these ideas
should, for the time being, be treated cautiously").
231. Evan Polman, Information Distortion in Self-Other Decision Making, 46 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 433 (2010).
232. Peter A. Ubel et al., Physicians Recommend Different Treatments for Patients than They
Would Choose for Themselves, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 630, 630-32 (2011).
233. Brian Zikmund-Fisher et al., A Matter of Perspective: Choosing for Others Differs from
Choosing for Yourself in Making Treatment Decisions, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 618, 620 (2006).
234. Jeremy Shapiro, Discounting for You Me and We 2, 4 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/jplaces/papers (finding that women in India
were less impatient when making investment decisions for others than for themselves).
235. Jinhee Choi et al., Variety-Seeking Tendency in Choice for Others: Interpersonal and
Intrapersonal Causes, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 590-95 (2006).
236. Ubel et al., supra note 232, at 631; Zikmund-Fisher et al., supra note 233, at 621.
237. Ubel et al., supra note 232, at 631.
238. Id. As long as intermittent bowl obstructions are not worse than death, then the first
treatment dominates the second. This study, along with several others, suggests that people make better
decisions for others than for themselves. Shapiro, supra note 234, at 4-5 (finding that women in India
were less impatient when making investment decisions for others than for themselves); Ubel et al., supra
note 232, at 631-32 (finding that doctors tended to choose a 1% risk of death over a 1% risk of
"intermittent bowl obstruction" for themselves but not for others); Zikmund-Fisher, supra note 233, at
619-20 (finding that more people chose a vaccination for others than for themselves when it eliminated a
10% chance of death but added a 5% chance of death).
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risks-here, fatality risks-and less on other risks or opportunity costs that
should also be relevant to the tradeoff.239
2. Biases and the Child Premium
The above biases are sometimes difficult to disaggregate in practice. For
example, if people appear to overreact to a particular risk, any or all of these
biases could be at work. These people might be overestimating the risk due to
the availability heuristic or the affect heuristic. Alternatively, they might be
accurately judging the relevant probabilities, but ignoring them. Therefore, this
section discusses these biases together. It will differentiate between the various
biases when the evidence makes this possible, but such evidence is not always
available. Ultimately, these biases do not undermine the child premium.
There is anecdotal evidence of parental paranoia-that is, parents either
overestimate some risks to their children or act as if they do. In the early 1970s
and 80s parents feared that people might poison or insert razor blades into
Halloween candy.240 Many children were told not to take any candy or food
that was not in its original factory-sealed packaging. Ironically, in the two
documented instances when children ate poisoned Halloween candy, it was the
child's parent who poisoned it.241 But even if candy is safe, the people handing
it out may not be. Above all else, parents appear to fear child abduction. 242Yet
the odds of abduction are very low. About 115 children are abducted by
strangers each year, compared to about 2,600 children who die annually in car
accidents. 243 Even if parents know on some level that the likelihood of a
stranger abduction is low, they may not be able to fully excise their fear from
their decision-making processes: "In conversations, most parents are prepared
to concede the fact that the likelihood of their child being abducted is minimal
. . . . However, such good common sense does not prevent the very same
239. Note that, in the studies of the child premium, the relevant costs are measured in money
rather than in side effects, and are paid for by the parent/decider, not the child. It is not clear whether or
how the use of a monetary metric might disrupt the patterns found in studies of self-other
decisionmaking, or how the fact that the parent (rather than the child) will pay the relevant costs would
affect these patterns.
240. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR 30-31 (2009).
241. Id. at 30-31.
242. JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN 125 (1990); Angela Mickalide, Creating Safer
Environments for Children, 70 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 263, 263 (1994) (reporting that kidnapping topped
the list of common parental fears).
243. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
JUVENtLE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 44 (2006) (reporting only 115
stereotypical child stranger abductions per year); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2003, 86 (reporting fatality rates for




parents from feeling burdened by a general sense of external danger . . "244
Today, vaccines appear to be a focus of parental fears. 245
This parental probability neglect is unlikely to have influenced existing
estimates of the child premium. Two of the published stated-preference studies
discussed in Section L.A asked questions about parents' WTP for a treatment
that would prevent cold or bronchitis symptoms.246 As overprotective as
parents might be, it is doubtful that they fear cold symptoms so much that they
cannot adequately assess the relevant probabilities. Kids get colds. Kids run
fevers. These common and passing harms are a far cry from child abduction
and poisoned candy. Similarly, there is a large difference between these
sensational risks and the more mundane (even if potentially fatal) risks of
everyday life. The studies exploring child premiums in the context of fatal risks
focused on everyday decisions in the face of mundane risks like purchasing a
safer car, choosing medication, and deciding whether to buy pesticide-free
food.24 7 Because parents navigate these risks every day, it is unlikely that
parents have never learned to assess the relevant probabilities and integrate
them into their decision making. Similarly, parents probably learn how to
accurately predict the hedonic effects of these everyday events on both their
children and themselves.
Just as probability neglect and hedonic adaptation do not appear to explain
the child premium, nor can the potential that parents systematically
overestimate the risks that their children face (due perhaps to the availability or
affect heuristic) or systematically underestimate their own risks (due to
overoptimism). The two studies that asked parents about their WTP to reduce
cold and bronchitis symptoms did not rely on probability judgments at all. They
asked questions about parents' WTP for a treatment that would prevent, with
certainty, inevitable cold or bronchitis symptoms.248 Each of these studies
presented parents with a riskless choice, and each found a 100% child
premium. Because these surveys did not include any risk assessments they
cannot be explained by biases related to the misestimation of risks. One
244. FRANK FUREDI, PARANOID PARENTING 110 (2001).
245. As of January 2011, 18% of Americans were convinced that autism was caused by
vaccines; another 30% were unsure. Amanda Gardner, Slightly More Than Half of Americans Say
Vaccines Don't Cause Autism: Poll, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 2011,
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/brain-and-behavior/articles/2011/01/20/slightly-
more-than-half-of-americans-say-vaccines-dont-cause-autism-poll. This fear is particularly resilient
because it combines parents' general fears about child safety with betrayal aversion and act/omission
biases in attribution. For a discussion of these biases, see Andrew D. Gershoff & Jonathan J. Koehler,
Safety First? The Role of Emotion in Safety Product Betrayal Aversion, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 140
(2011).
246. Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1153; Liu et al., supra note 97, at 320.
247. See supra Section I.A.
248. Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1153; Liu et al., supra note 97, at 319. Of course,
subjects might not have believed that the cold or bronchitis symptoms were inevitable. This seems
particularly unlikely for something as common as a cold, but more likely in the case of bronchitis. If
parents thought that their children were more likely to get bronchitis than they were, and parents were
not able to put this belief aside, then the resulting child premium would be biased upward.
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additional published stated-preference study asked parents whether they
thought their and their children's actual risk were higher or lower than the risk
presented in the survey.249 Even after controlling for these subjective risk
assessments, the researchers found an 80% child premium.2 5 0
Finally, it is unlikely that self-other decision-making dynamics explain the
child premium. In one of the studies described in the previous paragraph,
subjects reported their WTP to reduce a risk faced by one of their children and
another adult in the household. 2 51 This study found a 15% "other-person
premium."252 It also found an 80% child premium.253 To tease out the effect of
the other-person premium from the child premium, the authors calculated an
alternate child premium using the ratio of the child VSL to the other-person
VSL and found a 60% child premium.2 54 Even if the entire other-person
premium is the result of biases that appear when deciding for others (which is
far from clear), and these same errors infect subject's choices for their children,
a large child premium remains.
3. Laundering Unbiased Preferences
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have recently suggested that some
preferences should be excluded from CBA even if they are well-informed.255
Their argument relies on intuitions about what events do and do not affect
someone's welfare. In their view, only the satisfaction of self-interested
preferences affects one's welfare. 256 Adler and Posner did not offer a sustained
21
typography of which preferences are adequately self-interested, 2 but they
suggested a few touchstones. 258 The first touchstone is remoteness. 2 5 9 Suppose I
260
meet a stranger on a train who has a terminal illness. When I leave the train I
may have a preference that the stranger recover. But it is unclear whether the
satisfaction of that preference increases my welfare.261 Similarly, my
preference that the universe is expanding rather than contracting seems to be
one that is irrelevant to my welfare. These preferences "might have nothing to
249. Hammitt & Haninger, supra note 73, at 73.





255. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 36.
256. Id. at 36.
257. Id. at 39, 135-36.
258. Id. at 39 ("[P]references that are morally motivated, and do not concern the subject's
mind or body, or entail her existence, are pretty clearly disinterested.").
259. Id. at 34-35.






do with [my] own life." 262 By contrast, if my preferred state of the world affects
my mind or body, then it is probably welfare-relevant. 263 Their second
264touchstone is whether a preference is morally motivated. Suppose I have a
preference to save a rare squirrel in Sri Lanka from extinction.2 65 If I value the
option of benefitting from the squirrel's existence in the future by, for example,
seeing the squirrel frolic, then my preference affects my mind or body and is
probably welfare-relevant. 266 But if my preference is instead rooted in a
perceived moral duty to save the squirrel, then Adler and Posner argue that it is
likely to be irrelevant to my welfare.267 They offer one suggestive caveat to this
touchstone. They imply that a preference to save the Sri Lankan squirrel could
be welfare-relevant even if morally motivated and remote, as long as saving the
squirrel was an important part of my life project.268 Regardless of whether they
would explicitly endorse this caveat, it has intuitive appeal. It seems odd to
claim that people who dedicate themselves to causes are unaffected by the
success or failure of their own life projects. Ultimately, Adler and Posner
recommend that agencies exclude from CBA those preferences that are both
269remote and predominantly morally motivated.
Adler and Posner's arguments are somewhat tailored to their discussion of
existence values in environmental CBA.270 An existence value is the value that
someone ascribes to the existence of something, regardless of whether they can
directly enjoy that thing.271 They argue that environmental existence values are
272remote and morally motivated. Accordingly, they argue that such values are
not welfare-relevant. 273
Parental preferences regarding their children's safety are potentially
suspect under Adler and Posner's vision of welfare-relevant preferences. It
seems likely that parents feel a moral obligation to protect their children. Such
familial obligation shares many of the same features as existence values in the
262. Id. at 36.
263. See id. at 39.
264. Id. at 34.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 34, 39.
267. Id. at 34.
268. See id. (noting that Sheila-the squirrel lover in their hypothetical-"has never traveled
to Sri Lanka, and never intends to, nor is she an environmentalist who's made species preservation her
life's work. . ." (emphasis added)).
269. Id. at 39. Later in their book they cease talking about remoteness and only mention
"morally motivated" preferences as suspect. Id. at 133-36. However, this is within their discussion on
existence values in environmental law, which they already argued were remote. Id. at 126.
270. See id. at 34, 126.
271. Id. at 126.
272. Id. at 126, 133-36.
273. Id. at 34, 127.
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environmental context.274 Parents value children in part because of the joy that
parents get from directly interacting with their children, but this does not
exhaust the value that parents place on their children. In fact, it may only be a
very small part of that value. Parents want their children to do well. This is so
regardless of whether the parent experiences her child's success. The idea that a
parent would have or care for a child predominantly because of that child's
direct use value is antithetical to common ideas about parenting. Such a parent
would be treating her child like a pet or an object, and not as a soon-to-be
autonomous being deserving of respect.
Although the preferences that underlie the child premium are partially
morally motivated, they are clearly not remote. Neither the fate of the stranger
on the train nor the fate of the Sri Lankan squirrel has a causal impact on my
body or mind, and therefore we might guess that their fates cannot impact my
welfare. But for the vast majority of parents, the fate of their child is not remote
in this way. It is in fact at the far other extreme.
Even if Adler and Posner were to focus solely on moral obligations rather
than on the confluence of remoteness and moral obligations, it is far from clear
that all morally motivated preferences are welfare-irrelevant. They seem to
suggest this when they imply that saving the Sri Lankan squirrel is welfare-
relevant to someone who has a strong enduring commitment to do so.275 While
it is plausible to argue that someone who reluctantly or reflexively complies
with a moral obligation is not necessarily improving her welfare, it is
implausible to argue that acting on a moral obligation wholeheartedly,
joyously, and with a great sense of meaning and pride is welfare-irrelevant. The
latter description, although a little melodramatic, is the better description of
parenthood.
4. Making Sense of the Child Premium
So far, this section has defended the child premium against the claim that
it reflects ill-informed preferences. It has also defended the child premium
against the claim that it is rooted in welfare-irrelevant preferences. The
remainder of this section constructs an affirmative case and argues that the
child premium reflects preferences that are readily cognizable as sensible and
reasonable. 276
274. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 69-70 (hypothesizing that the existence
value of friends' and relatives' lives is likely to be high); Adler, supra note 23, at 1948 (suggesting that
reducing risk to family members might be partially the result of disinterested preferences).
275. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 34.
276. 1 do not claim that the analysis in this section is the only or the best way to conceptualize
the value of childhood risk reductions. Rather, it is one of several plausible ways to think about those
risk reductions, and a particularly intuitive one. When there are several plausible ways to value




The child premium reflects the idea that parents are willing to increase
their own risk to lower the risk to their children. Consider the most extreme
versions of this: when parents or relatives put themselves at extreme immediate
risk in order to save a child. In 2001, second-grader Jessie Arbogast was
attacked by a seven-foot shark in shallow waters off the coast of Florida.277 His
uncle not only dove in to save the boy but also dragged the thrashing shark to
shore to retrieve his nephew's severed arm from its mouth.278 Recall also
Melanie and Aaron Richman, who risked their lives to prevent a car thief from
taking their child.279 Most people would not react to these stories by lamenting
the irrationality of the adults involved. Instead, the motivations of these adults
are likely to be viewed not only as understandable but also admirable. This is
not to say that these adults acted on the basis of calm, calculated cost-benefit
analysis. Far from it. But the clearly emotional motivation of these adults is one
that people are likely to accept as stable and well-informed rather than the
result of some form of error: "[P]arents are not rational actors in the commonly
accepted meaning of the term. Yet their seemingly irrational acts make perfect
sense in the context of the human experience of parenthood."280 This is perhaps
because the concepts of self and other blur between parents and their
children. 281
If it is true that the concepts of self and other blur for parents and their
children, one might wonder why parents value their child's safety more highly
than they value their own. There are plausible reasons supporting the rationality
of the child premium for both non-fatal and fatal risks, although the underlying
reasons supporting a child premium in each case are somewhat different.
In the context of non-fatal risk reductions, the child premium emerges
from two simple and plausible assumptions. First, parents seek to maximize the
joint welfare of themselves and their children.282 Second, parents feel their
children's pain, while children do not necessarily feel their parents' pain.
Suppose that adults are willing to pay $100 to reduce a risk that they
themselves will develop bronchitis. This figure is the result of a combination of
the economic and non-economic costs of bronchitis. Perhaps $50 is attributable
to the adult's WTP to avoid medical costs, and another $50 is attributable to
277. Timothy Roche, Saving Jessie Arbogast, TIME, July 30, 2001,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1000445,00.html.
278. Id.
279. See supra note I and accompanying text.
280. Barbara Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning
Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. REV. 2493, 2497 (1995).
281. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 112-14 (1993);
Woodhouse, supra note 280, at 2498 ("Parenthood in action requires suspending objectivity and
adopting an inherently other-centered subjectivity made possible by the blurring of emotional
boundaries between self and other.").
282. This is a common assumption within economic analyses of the family. Pollack, supra
note 40, at 117. This assumption could be weakened, such that the parent maximizes a household utility
function that includes both her own and her child's utility, but gives greater weight to her own utility, as
long as it still gives sufficient weight to the child's utility.
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their WTP to avoid the pain and suffering associated with bronchitis. Now
suppose that a parent is considering how much to spend to reduce the
probability that her child will develop bronchitis that will create the same
medical costs and the same amount of suffering for the child. So far, it appears
that the parent would be willing to pay $100. But if parents feel their children's
pain, then the non-economic costs of child bronchitis must be inflated to take
account of its welfare effects on both parent and child. A simple model might
suppose that the parent suffers an equal amount as the child. If this is correct,
then the parent would be willing to pay $150 to reduce the child's risk: $50 to
reduce the risk of incurring the medical cost, $50 to avoid the risk that her child
will suffer, and another $50 to reduce the risk that she will suffer from seeing
her child suffer. This simple model is consistent with a child premium. To
clarify, this model presumes an asymmetry: parents feel their children's pain,
but children don't feel their parents' pain. The basic contours of this model, and
the asymmetry built into it, are also supported by parents who say: "I could not
live with myself if something happened to my child."283 Guilt and regret are
powerful emotions that create serious welfare losses.284
It is not clear that the same asymmetry exists in the context of fatal risks.
Losing a child is one of the most painful human experiences, and one of the
most enduring. 2 8 5 But losing a parent while you are still a child is also likely to
create immense suffering that reverberates over the child's lifetime. 2 86 While a
child may not notice her parent's illness, she is sure to notice her parent's
death. Accordingly, it is not clear that parents should prefer a risk of parental-
death and child-suffering over a risk of child-death and parental-suffering.
The child premium makes sense even for fatal risks as long as the parent
is attempting to maximize the joint welfare of the parent and the child.287 If, for
example, welfare is a function of life-years, then risk-wealth tradeoffs should
favor the young over the old. The few studies that have asked people to explain
283. FUREDI, supra note 244, at 111.
284. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk:
Bias, Sequentiality. and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 149 (1995) (discussing judicial
regret in the context of removing children from potentially unsafe homes); Chris Guthrie, Better Settle
Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 43; Marcel
Zeelenberg & Rik Pieters, Consequences of Regret Aversion in Real Life: The Case of the Dutch
Postcode Lottery, 93 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 155, 155 (2004).
285. Shirley A. Murphy, The Loss of a Child, in HANDBOOK OF BEREAVEMENT RESEARCH
AND PRACTICE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND INTERVENTION 375, 376 (Margaret Stroebe et al. eds.,
2008) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF BEREAVEMENT RESEARCH).
286. Linda J. Luecken, Long-Term Consequences of Parental Death in Childhood, in
HANDBOOK OF BEREAVEMENT RESEARCH, supra note 285, at 397, 397-98.
287. The concept of a parent maximizing a joint parent/child utility function is a rather
technical way to express common themes of parenthood. "The human heart was not designed to beat
outside the human body and yet, each child represented just that-a parent's heart bared, beating forever
outside its chest." DEBRA GINSBERG, RAISING BLAZE 188 (2002). "Sometimes when you pick up your
child you can feel the map of your own bones beneath your hands. . . . This is the most extraordinary
thing about motherhood-finding a piece of yourself separate and apart that all the same you could not




why they prefer to allocate scarce health resources to children support the idea
that life-years matter, at least in a rough way.288 Therefore, at least part of the
child premium is rooted in the sensible notion that children have more years
ahead of them. Although the relationship between welfare and life-years is not
linear, it need not be to produce the child premium.
"Fair innings" arguments can support a preference for child safety while
denying that the normative justification for doing so is rooted in claims that
each life year is equally valuable.
The fair innings argument takes the view that there is some span of years that we consider a
reasonable life. Let's say that a fair share of life is the traditional three score and ten, seventy
years. Anyone who does not reach 70 suffers, on this view, the injustice of being cut off in
their prime. They have missed out on a reasonable share of life; they have been shortchanged.
Those, however, who do make 70 suffer no such injustice, they have not lost out but rather
must consider any additional years a sort of bonus .... The fair innings argument requires that
everyone be given an equal chance to have a fair innings ... but, having reached it, they have
received their entitlement .2 8
Originally, the fair innings argument split people into two groups: those who
had surpassed the average life expectancy, and those who had not.290 The latter
group had a stronger moral claim to recourses than the former.291 But the fair
innings argument is compatible with a number of different groupings. For
example, people might deserve a chance to accomplish certain major life
milestones, each of which could be a relevant threshold for purposes of a fair
innings argument. Different people might use different milestones, but there is
likely to be widespread agreement that children deserve a chance to develop
into adults, or perhaps to have children of their own. Life-years prior to having
the opportunity to reach these or other milestones would be more valuable than
those that occur later. 292
C. Other Normative Objections
This section focuses on two additional critiques. First, the child premium
discriminates against adults. Second, the child premium is less attractive than
using a uniform VSL for all people. Neither of these critiques is convincing.
288. See, e.g., Tsuchiya et al., supra note 112, at 694 tbl.6.
289. JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE 91 (1985).
290. Erik Nord, Concerns for the Worse Off: Fair Innings Versus Severity, 60 Soc. Scl. &
MED. 257, 258 (2005).
291. Id.
292. This presumes that the child has a good chance of achieving the relevant milestone.
People give children less priority for medical interventions that would add five years and only five years
to the patient's life span. Such interventions may not allow children to achieve the relevant milestone
and hence might not be worth much under a normative view that prioritized such milestones. Tsuchiya
et al., supra note 112, at 692, 693 (finding that 76% of subjects gave a five-year-old patient first priority
for a life saving treatment, but only 39% did so when the benefit was only a five year extension of life
followed by death).
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1. Fairness to Adults
One might object to the child premium by arguing that it discriminates
against adults. However, this would be a very weak objection. The child
premium does not treat people differently, let alone do so in a way that is
unjust. Of course, the child premium does favor child safety over adult safety.
But all adults were once children. The child premium affects the distribution of
safety across one's life, but does not affect the overall amount of safety
provided to particular people. Adults cannot complain about a child premium if
293
they benefitted from that premium when they were children. But this leads to
a modified objection. People who were adults at the time of the adoption of a
child premium would incur the costs of the child premium (in the form of
higher taxes or higher product prices) without receiving the benefits. This
group can plausibly claim that they are being treated unfairly. Nonetheless, this
modified objection is also weak. The concerns raised by transitioning to a
system that relies on a child premium should not infinitely delay a program that
better reflects the preferences of millions of current and future people. Subjects
in the studies from Part I appear to agree. Far from objecting to the child
premium, these adults (both parents and non-parents) give priority to children.
This suggests that these adults do not find the modified objection convincing.
2. The Child Premium vs. A Uniform VSL
Agencies currently ignore heterogeneity and use a uniform VSL.294 They
do so despite a great deal of evidence that WTP figures vary across persons and
295 296context. Wealthy people have higher WTP, as do more educated people
even after controlling for income.297 There are also gender and racial effects on
298WTP. If there are plausible normative reasons for ignoring differences
between these groups, then we might ask: why treat childhood differently than
gender, race, income, or education?
There are two normative arguments in favor of using a uniform VSL.
Both arguments deny that increasing overall welfare is the only goal of
regulation. The first argument draws on distributional justice, and the second
293. Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205,
220 (2004); NATHAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS' KEEPER? 41 (1988) ("An institution that treats the
young and old differently will, over time, still treat people equally.").
294. Robinson et al., supra note 130, at 6.
295. Viscusi, supra note 77, at 1-13.
296. Id. at 7; Robinson et al., supra note 130, at 10.
297. Hammitt & Haninger, supra note 73, at 73-75.
298. Id.; Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1163; John D. Leeth & John Ruser,
Compensating Wage Diferentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 257, 270 (2003); Todd H. Wagner et al., Does Willingness to Pay Vary by
Race/Ethnicity? An Analysis Using Mammography Among Low-Income Women, 58 HEALTH POL'Y 275,




draws on the concept of expressive harm. Neither is inconsistent with a child
premium.
First, the use of a uniform VSL might prevent objectionable distributional
consequences. Those who favor a uniform VSL on distributive grounds
compare the uniform VSL to one that is customized based on an individual's
WTP.30 0 This system would assign a relatively low VSL to poor people and a
relatively high VSL to rich people.301 This, in turn, could lead to objectionable
outcomes. For example, if the government had to choose where to put a
hazardous waste site, a CBA would favor placing it in a poor neighborhood
where lives are less valuable.302 A VSL that does not vary with wealth helps
prevent this result.303 But the question of whether to adopt a child premium is
orthogonal to the question of whether to customize VSLs based on an
individual's WTP. 30 4 The child premium affects the poor and the rich in the
same way: increasing the estimate of monetized benefits when regulations
protect their children.305
299. This consideration, of course, presumes that agencies should consider distributional
justice in addition to efficiency when setting policy. There is a robust debate about whether legal rules
should be used as a tool for distributional justice. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667,
667 (1994) (arguing that "redistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution
through the income tax system and typically is less efficient"), with Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the
Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Respose to Kaplow and Shavell, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2004) (discussing informational barriers to designing the tax system that
Kaplow and Shavell envision), and Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology
of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1791 (2005) (discussing psychological barriers to
implementing optimal tax policy). This section assumes for the sake of argument that agencies should be
attuned to distributive justice concerns. This assumption is consistent with the Executive Orders of
Presidents Obama, Bush, and Clinton, all of which require agencies to consider the distributive impacts
of their regulations. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No.
13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007); Exec. Order 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557-61 (1994).
300. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 73-74, 149-50.
301. Hammitt & Robinson, supra note 167, at 7.
302. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 149-50.
303. Note that this is not really an argument for a uniform VSL. It is an argument against
assigning a lower VSL to poorer people; it is not an argument against using higher values for poorer
people or against adjusting the VSL based on personal characteristics that do not trigger distributional
concerns. For example, distributional justice does not require assigning the same VSL to those who
choose to skydive and those who do not.
304. Of course, the child premium hinders distributive justice in at least a trivial way. Any
time policymakers invest limited resources into any goal other than furthering distributive justice, they
are compromising their distributive justice goals.
305. The child premium could be seen as creating a distributional benefit if children are
viewed as worse off than adults. Alternatively, if worse-off adults have more children, then benefiting
all children will disproportionately benefit households that are worse off. See Greg Bognar, Age-
Weighting, 24 ECON. & PHIL. 167, 182-83 (2008) (noting that children might be seen as worse off than
adults because they "have had fewer goods in their" lives so far).
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The second defense of a uniform VSL is that it symbolizes equal respect
for all persons.306 Using different VSLs for different racial groups, or for men
and women, could be seen as encouraging people to think that these groups are
fundamentally different and worth more or less than one another.
A child premium would not send a message of unjust inequality. Everyone
passes through childhood prior to reaching adulthood. Because everyone was a
child once, treating children differently than adults affects all people equally.307
Further, treating children differently than adults is considered appropriate in a
wide range of contexts. For example, children are compelled to attend school,
they cannot purchase or consume alcohol, and have restricted driving
privileges. 308 Given this background of child exceptionalism, it is unlikely that
people would interpret the child premium as an affront to equality or equal
human dignity. In fact, the studies from Section I.B suggest that people not
only think governments are permitted to give children priority, they think that
governments should do so.
III. The Alternate-Models Approach
At this point, many readers may be sympathetic to the idea that agencies
should incorporate a child premium into their analyses in some fashion. The
most straightforward way to do so would be for each agency to update its
standard VSL model. This is precisely what the EPA is currently seeking to do
with the cancer premium. 30 9 In part because the child premium will only affect
a subset of regulations, and in part because of the advantages of the alternate-
models approach, the child premium can be most usefully deployed as an
inaugural candidate for the alternate-models approach.
A. Updating the Standard VSL Model
Adopting the child premium is likely to have an impact-albeit a modest
one-on the quantified benefits within CBA.310 It will be useful to start with
some examples of where the child premium will have the least effect. A child
premium would have increased the benefits of fatality reductions under the
306. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 72 (noting that the use of different VSL
numbers is "difficult to reconcile with ideals of democracy and equal treatment under the law, let alone
the sacredness of every human being").
307. See sources cited supra note 293.
308. Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 Hous. L. REv. 1107, 1111 n.14 (2012).
309. WHITE PAPER, supra note 151, at 60.
310. It will have a much smaller effect on the overall complexity of CBA. CBA is long past
the point where it can claim to be a simple parsimonious decision procedure; it is already steeped in
complexity. See McGarity, supra note 6, at 2343, 2355 (discussing the data requirements for CBA, and
its many mathematical machinations). Adding the child premium or the cancer premium will only
minimally increase CBA's complexity. In many cases, agencies already have data on the age of persons
who suffer morbidity and mortality and data on whether morbidity or mortality was caused by cancer.




Clear Skies Initiative by about $135 million per year. 3 Although an extra
$135 million in benefits every year is a hefty amount, it is small compared to
the overall predicted benefits of the Clear Skies Initiative of over $50 billion
per year.3 12 The child premium will normally have only a small impact on
environmental regulations simply because many of the harms that the EPA
seeks to prevent result from cumulative exposures, which does not result in
harm for many years. For example, the Clear Skies Initiative's reduction in
particulate matter was expected to save 30 children, 1,900 people aged 18 to
64, and 6,000 people aged 65 and up. 3 The child premium would have a
larger effect on the quantified benefits of non-fatal illnesses because children
are disproportionately affected by the non-fatal illnesses that air pollution
causes.314 But the overall effect would still be modest.
The child premium can have a larger effect on regulations that derive
much of their benefit from preventing sudden deaths, rather than from
preventing deaths with long latency periods. Department of Transportation
(DOT) regulations provide a potential area where the child premium can have a
larger impact. For example, an upcoming DOT regulation seeks to prevent
back-over deaths.31 Every year in the United States, about 100 children are
killed and another 2,300 are injured in their own driveways when they wander
or hide behind the family car as it backs out of the driveway. 3 Regulations
like this one-that specifically target children-are more likely to be affected
by a child premium. Consider also child restraints in cars. In 2003, OMB
examined and adjusted the DOT's quantified benefits for child restraint
311. See EPA CLEAR SKIES, supra note 16, at 5 tbl.1b. Although the Clear Skies Initiative was
never passed, its thorough CBA serves as a useful example.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 64 tbl.16.
314. See id. (reporting 271,000 instances of quantifiable non-fatal health effects in children
and 9,900 such effects in adults). The child premium affects the monetized benefits of any risk reduction
(fatal or not) measured by WTP.
315. If these most recent WTP estimates to avoid a day of coughing, chest pain, shortness of
breath, and fever were applied to the EPA's retrospective study of the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 1990,
and a child premium were applied, then the benefits would increase by $465 billion over that twenty
year period, and the share of benefits attributable to reducing respiratory illnesses would rise from 1.5%
to 8.6%. Dickie & Messman, supra note 96, at 1171.
316. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rear Visibility, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,417 (proposed
Mar. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 571). This rule is currently under consideration.
317. Greg Hunter, SUV Backover Deaths: What Can Be Done?, CNN (Nov. 7, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/AUTOS/tipsandadvice/l/03/backover.
318. The child premium could also affect food safety regulations, which tend to
disproportionately benefit children and the elderly. See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell
Eggs During Production, Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030, 33,053 (July 9, 2009) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16 and 118). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) normally uses a
uniform VSL to monetize fatal risks, and a child premium would increase the benefits of reducing those
risks. See, e.g., id. at 33,056. The FDA monetizes the benefits of preventing non-fatal illnesses by
calculating the quality adjusted life years (QALYs) that preventing those illnesses would yield and then
monetizing those QALYs. See, e.g., id. at 33,054-56. The child premium suggests that the FDA should
use a higher monetary equivalent for childhood QALYs. Section IV.B will discuss the impact of the
child premium on other QALY-based decision procedures.
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systems.3 19 The DOT estimated that the child restraints would save 36-50
children per year.320 OMB discounted these benefits to a present-equivalent of
25-35 children per year, and then discounted the remaining life-years of these
three-year olds such that saving each child was the equivalent of saving only
fourteen current life-years.321 As Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling noted:
"The combined effect of OMB's 'double discounting' was to slash the
estimated benefits of tighter restrictions on child restraints by over 85 percent.
In a cost-benefit world, cutting benefits by such a large amount drastically
weakens the case for government intervention."322 A child premium would
have partially offset this reduction in quantified benefits, and strengthened the
case for government intervention.323 The child premium will also have a greater
impact when agencies seek to achieve a particular ratio between costs and
benefits (in the simplest case, equalizing them) and increases in safety
investment tend to lead to continuous increases in safety. For example, when
the DOT set standards for roof crush resistance it sought to come as close to
equalizing the costs and benefits as possible within the constraint that rules
generally have to have a positive impact to pass OMB scrutiny.324 In the
context of car roofs, there were no large discontinuities in the relationship
between safety investments and safety. Each additional dollar of quantified
325benefits allowed the DOT to increase roof strength. In these situations, the
child premium could affect the content of the ultimate rule.
The importance of the child premium does not lie primarily in its capacity
to influence a broad swath of regulations, but rather in its ability to serve as the
thin edge of the wedge to open up a space for agencies to experiment with other
premiums, such as cancer premiums and perhaps the incorporation of a broader
set of altruistic values.326 It can do this in two ways. First, the defense of the
child premium serves as a proof of concept that CBA can accommodate risk
319. Ranking Regulatory Investments in Public Health, FY 2003 Budget Analytical




322. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 197.
323. In this instance, OMB was conducting cost-effectiveness analysis, rather than cost-benefit
analysis. See Section IV.B for further discussions of cost-effectiveness analysis.
324. Personal communication from Christopher Wiacek, NHTSA Office of Crashworthiness
Standards to author (May II, 2012) (commenting on Roof Crush Resistance, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348 (May
12, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 and 585)); see also REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note
I1, at II ("Under rules that have been in place since the early days of the Reagan administration, most
major new environmental, health and safety regulations must pass a cost-benefit test before they can be
adopted.").
325. Id.
326. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 70 ("We are not aware of any
attempts to quantify the existence value of another person's life; but we are sure that, if the value of life
is a number in the first place, then there is a substantial existence value to the life of a stranger, let alone
a relative or friend."); see also Brady, supra note 157, at 542 (arguing that the VSL should include




attitudes that do not fit neatly into actuarial models. Thus, it should help
promote social science research into other premiums. Section IV.A revisits the
cancer premium and briefly sketches a social science research strategy that has
the potential to clarify whether the cancer premium reflects well-informed
welfare-relevant preferences. Second, the child premium can further promote
experimentation with other VSL models, and any other model within CBA, by
helping establish and entrench the alternate-models approach. Although Part I
argued that the child premium should be uncontroversial, valuing different lives
differently implicates deeply held values and hence it is the type of judgment
that agencies should make only if they communicate the nature of their decision
to more democratically accountable bodies. This makes the child premium a
good inaugural candidate for the alternate-models approach.
B. The Advantages of the Alternate-Models Approach
Under the alternate-models approach, agencies would report the benefits
of a regulation under both their current uniform VSL model and an alternate
VSL model that incorporates the child premium. Although agencies would
report the results of multiple VSL models, they would have discretion over
which model to rely on to set final rules.
The alternate-models approach has substantial advantages over simply
updating the standard VSL model. More specifically, it can mitigate two well-
documented problems in administrative rulemaking. First, judicial review and
political oversight create incentives for agencies to spend years gathering and
weighing data so that they can make a final, complete, and confident
determination about the appropriate rule. This front-loaded defensive decision-
making process causes substantial delay in response to innovation. Second,
agencies also have incentives to downplay a particular kind of uncertainty-
model uncertainty-which encompasses various policy decisions embedded
within CBA. Roughly speaking, the first problem concerns technocratic issues
regarding how agencies incorporate new scientific knowledge, and the second
addresses institutional and normative issues concerning the value judgments
inherent in CBA. Reporting a child premium (or any other premium) as an
alternate model sends a signal to stakeholders and scientists that these
premiums could have real-world effects on regulation. This will help spur
research into those models and allow agencies to drive innovation rather than
following it slowly. In addition to spurring technocratic research, the alternate-
models approach can also help spur normative debate about the value
judgments embedded within CBA.
The same incentives that cause agencies to engage in defensive decision-
making and to downplay the value judgments within CBA are also likely to
make agencies reluctant to embrace the alternate-models approach. In these
situations, either Congress or the OMB can provide a useful corrective by
requiring reluctant agencies to report alternate models. For example, Congress
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might enact a statute that lists specific alternate models that agencies should
report, or require agencies to report any model that passes a certain threshold of
credibility; the judiciary would then enforce these requirements.3 27
Alternatively, the OMB might issue guidelines that require agencies to report
alternate models. This would mirror existing ways that the OMB guides
agencies. For example, the OMB encourages agencies to use a VSL between $1
million and $10 million but allows them discretion within that range,32 8 and
encourages agencies to use both a 3% and a 7% discount rate, yet leaves it to
agencies to decide which to rely on if they conflict. 3 The alternate-models
approach is an extension of this existing pattern of OMB oversight.330 A precise
balancing of the potential roles of Congress, the OMB, and the judiciary in
enforcing an alternate-models approach is beyond the scope of this Article.
1. Front-Loaded Decision-making and the Alternate-Models Approach
Administrative law favors a great deal of pre-rulemaking assessment.
Executive Order 12,291 and its progeny require agencies to conduct CBA for
certain rules; 33 the OMB enforces these requirements and can prevent rules
from going forward if agencies have not sufficiently justified them.332 Courts
conduct "hard look" review to ensure that agencies engage in reasoned
decision-making.333 The combination of these forces has led to an excess of
caution: "[A]gencies systematically engage in excess data gathering, protracted
analysis of the data and associated public comments, and extraordinarily
detailed explanation of the bases and purposes of their final rules in an attempt
to insulate their policies from judicial reversal"334 and OMB interference.
Many scholars have embraced adaptive management theory as a response
to the above dynamics. The alternate-models approach, however, is better
327. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 22, at 1711 (advocating an amendment to the
Administrative Procedure Act requiring agencies to disclose trans-scientific assumptions and allowing
judges to enforce that requirement).
328. See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 30-31 (providing this range and asking
agencies to "explain any significant deviations from the prevailing state of knowledge").
329. Id. at 33-34.
330. Under the George W. Bush administration, for example, John Graham encouraged
agencies to report CBA results using both the VSL and the value of a statistical life year. See OMB
CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 30.
331. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72
Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007); Exec. Order 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557-61 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127, 131 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
332. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 2, at 4.
333. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
334. Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem ofRulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1700, 1706 (2008).
335. REvEsz & LIVERMORE, supra note I1, at 49-50 (arguing that the EPA developed




suited than adaptive management as a tool to confront defensive decision-
making in the context of innovating the VSL.
Adaptive management theory was designed to overcome the shortcomings
of front-loaded models of regulation in situations where the regulator's
knowledge was rapidly developing.3 36 The core idea of adaptive management is
"learning by doing,"337 as opposed to the traditional agency management style
which might be called "learning before doing." Adaptive management shifts
the regulator's focus away from determining a single best rule, and toward
setting up an iterative system of incremental experimentation, monitoring, and
reassessment. 3 Under this approach agencies would implement rules
provisionally, monitor the results, and adjust those rules to account for new
information. 33 9 Instead of rulemaking being akin to flipping a single switch
once and for all, it should work at least partially like a dial, allowing agencies
to adjust the rule (perhaps within limits) after it is implemented.340 This core
idea has strong intuitive appeal.34'
Although adaptive management is attractive in theory, it has been
disappointing in practice.342 At best, agencies have instituted adaptive
management "lite." 343 The ideal adaptive management plan outlines specific
experiments and monitoring techniques that ensure that agencies learn. For
example, a forest management plan might separate areas into different zones,
allow differing logging techniques in each, and monitor the effects of those
logging techniques on waterways. 344 In reality, agencies don't design such
experiments and often don't even have the funds to monitor the results of their
rulemaking. 34 5 These funding constraints create substantial slippage between
adaptive management theory and practice.
The alternate-models approach avoids these problems. Unlike in
traditional adaptive management contexts, agencies need not design
336. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REv.
1455, 1457 (2011); J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems-With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1373, 1390 (2011).
337. J.B. Ruhl & Robert Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV.
424, 431 (2010) (describing this as the "bumper sticker" version of adaptive management theory).
338. Ruhl, supra note 336, at 1390; J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It
Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SC. & TECH. 21, 28 (2006).
339. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 337, at 438.
340. Id. (offering the switch and dial analogy).
341. R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications to
Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2411 (2006) ("The central premise
of learning by doing is so attractive and universally intuitive that one is hard pressed to find an
environmental resource management plan . . . that does not make at least some form of commitment to
the use of [adaptive management]."); Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 337, at 424 ("Adaptive management
... has become infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity.").
342. Doremus, supra note 336, at 1457-58.
343. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 337, at 435, 441.
344. Id. at 449-51 (describing the Northwest Forest Plan as an example of well-executed
adaptive management).
345. See, e.g., id. at 441, 481-82.
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experiments or monitor results in order to fill their knowledge gaps. When
agencies report alternate VSL models, they signal to stakeholders that they may
someday come to rely on one of those alternate models for purposes of its
rulemaking. This will likely incentivize stakeholders to invest in examining
these alternate models. If agencies reported a child premium, some industries
would respond by sponsoring studies that critiqued it. Other industries (perhaps
those whose products are already exceedingly safe for children) would invest in
promoting the premium. This will produce information that is relevant to
updating and improving the VSL model. This dynamic eliminates the major
impediment to implementing adaptive management-resource constraints-
and suggests that the alternate-models approach can play an important role in
spurring technocratic research and driving innovation.
2. Model Uncertainty and the Alternate-Models Approach
In the process of estimating costs and benefits, agencies must confront a
great deal of uncertainty. In order to deal with some of these uncertainties,
agencies turn to models. A classic example is the EPA's efforts to model how
widely and quickly pollutants spread through the air.346 These models attempt
to generate a set of parameters that influence the relevant outcome (here the
spread of a pollutant) and then to determine the mathematical relationship
among those parameters.
Model predictions are subject to two main sources of uncertainty:
parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty.347 Parameter uncertainty is the
uncertainty involved in assigning a specific value to any particular parameter in
the model.348 For example, if the model includes humidity as a parameter, there
may be uncertainty about what point estimate to use. Model uncertainty is the
uncertainty involved in deciding which parameters to include in the model and
determining their relationship to one another.349 Compared to parameter
uncertainty, model uncertainty is often more important yet harder to address. 350
Model uncertainty is closely intertwined with "trans-scientific"35' or
"science policy" 352 questions that agencies must answer.353 These questions
346. James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models
and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 912-16 (2005).
347. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON MODELS IN THE REGULATORY DECISION
PROCESS, MODELS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 134 (2007) [hereinafter NRC
MODELS].
348. Id.
349. Id. at 131.
350. Id. at 134.
351. Wagner, supra note 22, at 1619-20.
352. Thomas McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution
ofScience Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 732 (1979).





look like scientific questions but cannot be answered by science.354 The issues
surrounding potential carcinogens provide a useful illustration. 355 To regulate
carcinogens based on animal studies, agencies must develop mouse-to-man
models that extrapolate from the high doses present in animal studies to the low
doses that humans are likely to encounter.356 Science cannot currently
determine whether the dose-response curve for low doses of carcinogens is
linear, sublinear, or supralinear. 357 The only way to make this determination is
to invoke a default rule. One such default rule might be to choose the model
that offers more protection from cancer; another might be to choose the model
that offers more protection from government regulation. This is a policy
choice.358
The distinction between science and trans-science is fuzzy but useful. The
terms track the following distinction: Some seemingly-scientific questions are
best answered by expert scientists, and others are best answered by the public
or publically accountable officials. "Trans-scientific" is the label attached to
questions of the second sort. Because the choice between different mouse-to-
man models implicates deep philosophical commitments to welfare and
autonomy, it is better made by a publically accountable official rather than an
expert in toxicology.
The current administrative law system is flawed because agencies make
these trans-scientific policy choices without sufficient oversight. Agencies lack
expertise in value judgments. 359 They also lack proper incentives to seek input
about those values. Agencies have powerful incentives to hide model
uncertainty and trans-scientific assumptions and pretend that they merely
follow the dictates of science. Agencies do not like to lose court cases. To
avoid being accused of resorting to mere "guesswork"360 when they adopt
particular rules, agencies often produce long, complex records that bury and
downplay the uncertainty. 3 The more an agency highlights model uncertainty,
the more it opens itself up to attack from courts, stakeholders, and politicians
354. McGarity, supra note 352, at 732; Wagner, supra note 22, at 1619.
355. See McGarity, supra note 39, at 125.
356. In the face of this uncertainty, the prevailing assumption for carcinogens is that there is a
linear relationship between dose and response, and that no exposure level is completely safe. Nicholas
Bagley & Richard Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260,
1321-22 (2006).
357. For a discussion of dose-response curves, see Wagner, supra note 22, at 1625.
358. Id. at 1623; McGarity, supra note 39, at 125-26.
359. Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1354 (2004).
360. Leather Indus. of Am., Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("While the EPA
'may 'err' on the side of overprotection,' it 'may not engage in sheer guesswork."').
361. Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1403 (1992); Wendy Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture,
59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1359-61 (2010) (noting that, although courts often extend great deference to
agencies, agencies nonetheless "engage in defensive overkill when developing rules").
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for merely guessing or, perhaps worse, for imposing its own contestable values
on regulated industries.
The existing literature about model uncertainty and trans-scientific
assumptions can inform debates about VSL innovations. The VSL embeds
trans-scientific assumptions. It is a prediction of the welfare effects of risk
reductions. To model this effect on welfare, the VSL makes various
assumptions. For example, the standard VSL model presumes that a single
362uniform VSL should apply to every person and every risk. This presumption
is a policy decision.363
The NRC's recent discussion of model uncertainty provides a useful
starting point for discussing model uncertainty in the VSL context. The NRC
stressed the importance of augmenting and improving the ways that agencies
communicate model uncertainty. 364 It suggested that agencies report the results
of their CBA using alternate models and used alternate VSL estimates of $1
million and $10 million as an illustration. It argued that using alternate models
is more faithful to the limitations of technocratic analysis:
Although it is hard to argue with the principle that regulations should do more good than
harm, there are substantial problems in reducing the results of a large-scale study with many
sources of uncertainty to a single number . . . . We contend that such an approach draws the
line between the role of analysts and the role of policy makers in decisionmaking at the wrong
place. . . . The notion [of| reducing the results of a large-scale modeling analysis to a single
number ... is at odds with one of the main themes that began this Chapter, that models are
tools for helping make decisions and are not meant as vehicles for producing decisions.36 5
The NRC's suggestion, however, is not as useful as it could be. It does not
sufficiently distinguish between model and parameter uncertainty. A
policyrnaker might look at the two VSL estimates and conclude that there is
merely parameter uncertainty regarding the VSL, which should be resolved by
the relevant expert, not by the policymaker.
A proposal by Wendy Wagner does a better job of communicating model
uncertainty. She proposed an Executive Order requiring agencies to report
CBA using two different sets of assumptions.366 Under the first, the agency
would answer all trans-scientific questions by using risk-averse assumptions
when they calculate regulatory benefits of, for example, reducing cancer
362. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 385.
363. Similarly, the VSL model assumes (based on policy, not science) that welfare is best
measured by preference satisfaction, and that preferences are best measured using WTP data. ADLER &
POSNER, supra note 15, at 1106.
364. NRC MODELS, supra note 347, at 15-16 ("EPA should place a high priority on ensuring
that stakeholders and others have access to models for regulatory decisionmaking. . . . It is most
important to highlight the critical model assumptions." (emphasis added)). The OMB agrees. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET & OFFICES OF SCI. & TECH. POL'Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
BULLETIN No. M-07-24, UPDATED PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ANALYSIS 7 (2007) ("[A] discussion of model
uncertainty can greatly inform risk management decisions.").
365. NRC MODELS, supra note 347, at 136.




rates. 367 Under the second, the agency would use risk-tolerant assumptions.36 8
This proposal does a good job of communicating the trans-scientific question to
policymakers.369 Policymakers are likely to understand that choosing a level of
risk tolerance is a value judgment that toxicologists are not specially qualified
to make. Instead, this is a question that must be answered by the policymakers
themselves. But notice that policymakers are likely to think that the midpoint
between a risk-averse benefits estimate and a risk-tolerant benefits estimate
approximates the risk-neutral estimate. They are also likely to think that a risk-
neutral choice is the easiest one to justify, because it is the one that deviates
least form the dictates of "sound science." Of course, given the uncertainty of
risk assessment there simply is no estimate within this range that hews closer to
"sound science" or that is demonstrably risk-neutral. But this point may be lost
on policymakers. This suggests that Wagner's proposal might not motivate
decision-makers to sufficiently engage with the relevant value judgment.
Wagner also proposed an amendment to the Administrative Procedures
Act that would require agencies to separate scientific questions from trans-
scientific ones and to provide reasons for answering those trans-scientific
questions in the way that they did.370 Cary Coglianese, Gary Marchant, and
Thomas McGarity have made roughly similar suggestions.37 1 This requirement
would improve transparency, but may not promote participation. Requiring
agencies to identify and explicitly answer trans-scientific questions does not yet
clarify the importance of those policy choices. The alternate-models approach,
however, can simultaneously highlight the existence of trans-scientific
questions, and clarify how important those questions are to the ultimate cost-
benefit calculations. If part of the goal of communicating model uncertainty is
to spur input or debate on trans-scientific assumptions, then quantifying the
impact of those assumptions is likely to be important.
Reporting both a standard VSL model and one that incorporated a child-
premium would not suffer from the problems outlined above. First,
policymakers are likely to understand that the choice between a uniform VSL
and a child-premium VSL requires a value judgment rather than simply
reflecting parameter uncertainty. Policymakers are much more likely to believe
that they have a role to play in deciding whether to value children more than
adults than whether to use $1 million or $10 million as the monetized value of a
statistical life. Second, policymakers are unlikely to unthinkingly adopt the
midpoint between the benefits estimate derived from the standard VSL and the
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1707-12. Her proposal could better highlight the value judgments that the
policymaker is supposed to make if the two sets of assumptions were re-characterized as "risk averse
regarding risks to human life" and "risk averse regarding risks of government intrusion."
370. Id. at 1711.
371. Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 359, at 1354-55; McGarity, supra note 352, at 746-
47.
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child-premium VSL. Every compromise between the uniform VSL and the
child-premium VSL embraces a child premium and an affirmative value
judgment to invest more in protecting children compared to adults. If
policymakers already agree that child safety should be valued more than adult
safety, why would they second-guess the single best estimate the agency
provided for that child premium? Of course, they might debate the magnitude
of the child premium, and perhaps come to a political compromise, but
selecting the midpoint of the two benefits estimates does not have the intuitive
appeal that it does when policymakers are presented with a risk-averse and risk-
tolerant estimate. Finally, using alternate VSL models quantifies the effects of
the relevant value judgments. Therefore, conducting alternative analyses both
with and without the child premium (or other VSL models, or any other
alternate model) has significant advantages over existing proposals for
communicating model uncertainty.
Communicating model uncertainty is the first step toward resolving it.372
To the extent that alternate models contain contested normative assumptions,
reporting them in CBA results can spur political input about those normative
assumptions. The EPA's experience with the "senior death discount"373 lends
support to this prediction. In 2002 the OMB asked the EPA to re-run its CBA
for the Clear Skies Initiative. 374 In response to that request, the EPA estimated
the benefits of the initiative using both its standard VSL estimate and a
modified VSL estimate that explicitly lowered the VSL for people sixty-five
and older by about one third. 7  The EPA essentially used two different VSL
models: a standard model and a model that was partially adjusted for life-years.
This senior death discount was salient enough to generate a great deal of
publicity. The controversy erupted during a series of town hall meetings by
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman.376 At one meeting, a flyer read:
"Seniors are Worth 3/5 of a Person." 377 This public debate-which was made
possible precisely because the EPA published CBA results using an explicit
alternate model rather than merely a range of potential estimates-essentially
transferred the decision about which model to follow from the agency to the
political arena. In that arena, the normative assumptions underlying the models
took center stage. Politicians and the public had to grapple with the potential
justifications for providing less safety for the elderly than for others. The public
ultimately rejected any such justifications and in doing so gave the EPA
372. Such uncertainty is "resolved" in a practical sense, in that policymakers decide how to
regulate in the face of such uncertainty. This does not mean that the uncertainty disappears.
373. Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire, EPA Drops the 'Senior Death Discount', WASH. POST, May
13, 2003, at E1.
374. John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 395, 471 (2008).
375. Viscusi, supra note 50, at 111.





painfully clear guidance on which model contained the stronger normative
assumptions. To be sure, this political debate contained its own pathologies and
overtones of interest group influence. Despite these imperfections, however,
this kind of political input seems especially important given agencies' limited
democratic pedigree.378
IV. Extensions
A. Beyond Children: The Cancer Premium Revisited
This Article's examination of the child premium provides a reason to be
optimistic that future social science research will be able to determine the
extent to which the cancer premium reflects well-informed welfare-relevant
preferences.
A strong case can be made that the cancer premium is rooted in biases.
Consider the U.K.'s 100% cancer premium.379 Regulations that use this
premium presume that people will pay double to eliminate a cancer risk
compared to a non-cancer risk. This would mean that people are indifferent
between a risk of a non-cancer death and a risk of experiencing cancer
symptoms but surviving, because they value avoiding each at the same amount.
This seems surprising and is plausibly the result of a cognitive or affective
error.380 Some conditions may be worse than death or as bad as death, but it
would be surprising if the average symptoms of the average cancer were as bad
as death. More than likely, evidence of the cancer premium is at least partially
skewed by biases. People systematically fear cancer more than most other
diseases. 3 The dreaded nature of cancer suggests that people may be making
cancer decisions with their (fearful) heart rather than their (rational) head.
378. Of course, not all of the uncertainty reveled by the alternate-models approach will be
resolvable. Two models may yield drastically different results, and the choice between those two models
may be a question of policy-albeit one that people do not have strong feelings about. Even in these
cases, the alternate-models approach is useful. Reporting multiple models, and publicizing the pivotal
importance of an unanswerable policy question, could go a long way toward mitigating the common
view of CBA as an answer machine. See Wagner, supra note 22, at 1706-08 (making similar arguments
about the benefits of reporting CBA with a set of risk tolerant and risk averse models).
379. THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 161, at 62 n.33.
380. See Sunstein, supra note 43, at 441.
381. About 35% of people fear cancer more than other diseases. Press Release, Cancer
Research UK, People Fear Cancer More than Other Serious Illness (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/cancer-info/news/archive/pressrelease/2011-15-08-fear-cancer-more-
than-other-diseases; YouGov Survey Results, YOUGov PLC., http://cdn.yougov.com/today-
uk-importyg-archives-life-cancerresearch-diseases-150811 .pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (reporting that
35% of British subjects feared cancer more than Alzheimer's disease, stroke and heart disease); Press
Release, Harvard School of Public Health, International Survey Highlights Great Public Desire to Seek
Early Diagnosis of Alzheimer's (July 20, 2011), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/201 I-
releases/alzheimers-intemational-survey.html (click "Click here for the complete survey" and see tbl.1
at I in the downloaded file) (reporting that 40% of Americans feared cancer more than Alzheimer's
disease, stroke, heart disease, diabetes, depression, or influenza).
117
Yale Journal on Regulation
Indeed, several scholars have argued peoples' strong reaction to cancer is
driven by unjustified fears.38 2
Despite these concerns, there are two ways to defend a cancer premium of
even 100 percent. First, people may fear cancer more than other harms, and this
fear is itself a cost that people could rationally seek to avoid or mitigate.
Second, people's responses to cancer may be rooted in a "rival rationality"383
that is sensitive to the social meaning of certain risks.384 These two theories
make empirical claims about why people exhibit cancer premiums. These
empirical claims can be tested.
A fear-based account of the cancer premium is plausible, even though it
has weaknesses. Even if people fear cancer for erroneous reasons, this fear is a
real cost. Because the fear of cancer is a real cost, reducing this fear is a real
benefit that could justify a cancer premium.3s There are two weaknesses with
this defense. First, if actuarially unjustified fear is the problem, then agencies
cannot presume that reducing actuarial cancer rates will decrease or eliminate
this fear. Second, even if reducing cancer rates reduces the fear of cancer, there
may be more cost-effective ways of reducing that fear, perhaps through public
information campaigns aimed at increasing trust in regulatory agencies or
providing people with additional process rights to share their concerns with
regulators.386 Although this fear-based defense of the cancer premium has
weaknesses, those weaknesses could be addressed empirically. For example, it
may be the case that reducing cancer rates is the most cost-effective way of
reducing cancer-inspired fear, and it may be that a few large cancer-reducing
regulations would go a long way toward mitigating this fear. Again, these are
empirical questions that agencies could begin to explore through surveys of the
general population.
The rival rationality thesis is more promising, but it too contains
weaknesses. Lay people assess risk differently than experts. 3 87 More
specifically, lay people consider a host of qualitative factors that experts
ignore. 38 These factors include whether the risk is involuntary vs. voluntary,
and man-made vs. natural.389 In the regulatory context, cancer risks are often
the result of man-made pollution that people are exposed to involuntarily.
These risks may be socially meaningful because allowing some people to
impose risks on others without their consent may threaten values such as
individual autonomy.390 It is possible that people are willing to pay more to
382. Peters et al., supra note 190, at S145-46 (2006); Sunstein, supra note 215, at 1139, 1145.
383. Douglas Kysar, The Expectation of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1706 (2003).
384. Id. at 1764, 1777.
385. Sunstein, supra note 210, at 121.
386. Kysar, supra note 383, at 1765.
387. Sunstein, supra note 215, at 1120-22.
388. SLOVIC, supra note 195, at 297.
389. Id.




reduce cancer risks because of these social meanings.3 9 1 Although promising,
the rival rationality thesis faces one major obstacle. It is not clear as an
empirical matter that people actually adopt the view that cancer risks carry
special social meanings. But again, social science can fill this gap. Recall that
several studies of the child premium included qualitative follow-up questions
where subjects could indicate why they prioritized children.392 Similar studies
could help determine the veracity of the rival rationality thesis and help
disentangle the part of the cancer premium rooted in it from the part that might
be rooted in erroneous factual predictions about the probability or severity of
cancer.
Although there are significant barriers to justifying a cancer premium,
there are reasons to be optimistic that further research can answer the question
of whether, and to what extent, the cancer premium reflects well-informed
preferences. The alternate-models approach can play a facilitative role in
motivating this research. Therefore, rather than pursuing the possibility of
incorporating the cancer premium into their standard VSL model, the EPA
should, for now, merely report it as an alternate model.
B. Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
In addition to having implications for CBA, the research outlined in Part I
has implications for cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). CEA compares
different programs based on how much each program costs to produce an
equivalent outcome as measured in, for example, lives-saved or life-years
saved. Unlike CBA, CEA does not place a single monetary value on a health
outcome, but rather compares different programs by the monetized cost of
achieving those health outcomes. 3 93 For example, a CEA might conclude that
Program A costs $100,000 per life-year saved, while Program B costs $200,000
394
per life-year saved. CEA does not comment on whether the proper value of a
life year is higher than $200,000 or lower than $100,000; thus, it cannot tell us
whether both programs are too expensive, or whether both programs are worth
funding. 3 95 Instead, it is often used with the assumption of a fixed budget, in
which case it can suggest reallocating funds to make better use of them.396
391. Id. at 1764, 1777.
392. See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
393. ALASTAIR M. GRAY ET AL., APPLIED METHODS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN
HEALTH CARE 9 (2010).
394. See id. at 14.
395. Id. at 9, 11. Note that researchers sometimes apply a cost-per-quality-adjusted-life-year
(QALY) threshold to the results of CEA to determine which programs are worth pursuing, but
monetizing QALYs is controversial. Id. at 22-26; WILHELMINE MILLER ET AL., VALUING HEALTH FOR
REGULATORY COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 181 (2006).
396. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 395, at 31-38; see also OMB, Analytical Perspectives,
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003, 420 (2002) [hereinafter OMB, Analytical
Perspectives] (noting that, with CEA, "decision makers can consider reallocating resources to those
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CEA has been used in the regulatory field to help decision makers
compare the relative value of multiple regulations. For example, the OMB has
used CEA to compare various regulations based on their costs per life saved,
and their costs per life-year saved.397
The studies in Section L.A suggest that these regulatory CEAs are not as
illuminating as they might initially appear.398 Many scholars have argued that
the proper goal of. decision makers in the regulatory context is to maximize
welfare.399 The studies in Section L.A suggest that the welfare effect of
protecting children is greater than the welfare effect of protecting adults. This
suggests that outcomes like lives saved and life-years saved are poor proxies
for the relative welfare impacts of various regulations. Focusing on lives saved
ignores the greater welfare effects of saving children rather than adults.
Although focusing on life-years saved incorporates an implicit child premium,
it is not large enough to reflect the greater welfare effects of saving children
compared to adults. 4 00
Although the OMB has used CEA, CBA remains the dominant decision-
making tool in regulatory analyses. By contrast, CEA is favored in the health
care field.401
In the health care field, the standard form of CEA analyzes a program's
effect on health, and measures health through quality-adjusted life years
402
(QALYs). To calculate QALYs, researchers assign a score of zero to one to
various health states, where one is equivalent to perfect health and zero is
equivalent to death.403 This health-related quality of life score is then multiplied
by the duration of the health state to provide a measure of health that is
rulemaking opportunities that rank the highest in cost-effectiveness"). CEA can also be used to identify
programs that are clearly dominated by others. GRAY, supra note 393, at 16.
397. OMB, Analytical Perspectives, supra note 420, at 419 (using costs per life-years saved to
compare regulations); OMB, Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1992, Part 11-370 (1991)
(reprinting CEA using lives-saved). The OMB has also given a qualified endorsement of conducting
CEA using QALYs. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 12-13. 1 will discuss QALY-based CEA
below.
398. For further critiques of similar CEAs, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at
44-50.
399. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 15, at 6; Eric Posner, Agencies Should Ignore
Distant Future Generations, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 139, 143 (2007).
400. Adjusting life-years to account for quality of life-hence creating QALYs-does not
resolve either problem. See infra notes 412-417 and accompanying text.
401. PETER NEUMANN, USING COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE
15(2005).
402. MILLER ET. AL., supra note 395, at 88. QALY-based CEA is sometimes called "cost-
utility analysis." GRAY, supra note 393, at 9. This Article avoids that term to avoid confusion. "Utility"
in cost-utility analysis does not mean the same thing as "utility" in discussions of welfare. Joanna Coast,
Maximization in Extra-Welfarism, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 786, 787 (2009). QALY-based CEA helps
decisionmakers maximize health (as measured in QALYs), not welfare. Werner Brouwer et al.,
Welfarism vs. Extra- Welfarism, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 325, 332-34 (2008). For further discussion of this
distinction, see Stephen Birch & Cam Donaldson, Valuing the Benefits and Costs of Health Care
Programmes, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1121 (2003).
403. Matthew Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 2 (2006).
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sensitive to both the duration of the illness and its severity.404 QALY-based
CEA indicates how to maximize QALYs with a given investment. 405
The studies in Section L.A do not have clear implications for QALY-based
CEA. Those studies measured the welfare impacts of childhood mortality or
morbidity on parents, rather than the health impacts of these potential events.
Quantifying welfare benefits through WTP studies is likely to yield different
results than quantifying health benefits through QALYs.406 Although parents no
doubt consider health-related spillover effects when answering WTP questions
about child risk reductions, their WTP figures are likely to be influenced by
much more than just the mental anguish that they would feel if their child died.
Parents want their children to flourish, and not merely because of the effects
that this might have on the parents' health. This disparity reflects the disparity
between an event's health effects and its potentially much broader welfare
effects.407
Although the studies in Section L.A do not have clear implications for
QALY-based CEA, the studies in Section I.B do. People routinely reject health
maximization as the appropriate social goal. For example, several studies
suggest that people give greater weight to saving the lives of patients who are
severely ill.408 That is, people prefer allocations of resources that favor these
patients over allocations that maximize the overall number of QALYs gained.
People also prefer non-QALY-maximizing allocations in order to rescue
patients in imminent danger of dying and to ensure that every patient has some
404. Id.
405. Dolan, QALYMaximisation, supra note 114, at 197.
406. Brouwer, supra note 402, at 332-34; see, e.g., Henrik Andersson et al., Willingness to
Pay and QALYs: What Can We Learn About Valuing Food-Borne Risk? I (Nov. 9, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
407. Within the narrow goal of maximizing QALYs, it is not clear that a child premium could
be justified. Such a premium would be justified if a child's death or illness normally has a larger health-
related spillover effects on other people-most notably her family-than the health-related spillover
effects that would accompany the death of her parent. But it is not clear that this is the case. It is possible
that parental death has larger health spillover effects, thus counseling for a parental premium rather than
a child premium. The empirical research has not developed sufficiently to help fill this theoretical gap.
Of course, childhood death causes many health-related spillover effects, but so too does adult death. See,
e.g., Paul Boyle et al., Does Widowhood Increase Mortality Risk?: Testing for Selection Effects by
Comparing Causes of Spousal Death, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1 (2011) (implying the existence of a
spousal premium by finding increased risk of mortality, even ten years after the death of a spouse); Jiong
Li et al., Hospitalization for Mental Illness Among Parents After the Death of a Child, 352 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1190, 1190 (2005); Jiong Li et al., Mortality in Parents After Death of a Child, 361 THE LANCET
363, 363 (2003). Further, more research needs to be done to convert these spillover effects to QALYs.
See Anirban Basu et al., A Time Tradeoff Method for Eliciting Partner's Quality of Life Due to Patient's
Health States in Prostate Cancer, 30 MED. DECISION MAING 355, 355-56 (2010) (noting that CEA has
not adequately incorporated intrafamilial spillover effects); Martin Knapp & Roshni Mangalore, "The
Trouble with QALYs . . .", 16 EPIDEMIOLOGIA E PSICHIATRIA SOCIALE 289, 289 (2007) (arguing that
existing health-status instruments that measure QALYs are insufficient to measure many mental health
effects).
408. Peter Ubel et al., Improving Value Measurement in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 38 MED.
CARE 892, 894 (2000).
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hope of obtaining care.409 Similarly, people favor saving a single child over
saving about 1.5 middle-aged adults and between 3 and 10 elderly people. 4 10 if
CEA gave more weight to programs that protected children, as opposed to
treating all QALYs as equivalent, then it would expand beyond a narrow focus
on maximizing QALYs and do a better job of tracking societal preferences for
allocating scarce health care resources.
Although QALYs provide an implicit child premium in some
circumstances, it is too small. In the context of fatal illnesses, it is not large
enough to mirror the child premium evinced by the studies in Section I.B. In
the context of nonfatal illnesses, QALYs do not provide any implicit child
premium.
Much like life-years, QALYs contain an implicit child premium for fatal
risks. But again, this implicit child premium appears to be too low. CEA
normally discounts future costs and benefits, including future QALY gains,
using a discount rate of 3%.411 Applying this discount rate to average life-
412 413expectancy and quality-of-life data, and comparing a risk reduction that
benefits a ten-year-old and a thirty-year-old, CEA would yield an implicit child
premium of about 19%. This is significantly lower than the estimate derived
from the study that quantified the comparative social value of saving a 5- to 15-
year-old vs. a 25- to 35-year-old, which found a child premium of about
50%.414 Similarly, QALYs produce a 97% child premium when comparing a
ten-year-old and a sixty-year-old, while data from the U.S. suggests that it
should be closer to 900%.415 A third study yielded a smaller disparity. This
study compared 5- to 15-year olds with 35- to 45-year-olds and found a 40%
416child premium. The child premium implied by the use of QALYs for these
age groups is slightly lower: 34%. Taken together, these three studies suggest
that the implicit child premium embedded within QALYs is too low, 4 17
although the precise magnitude of the discrepancy is difficult to estimate with
409. Paul Menzel et al., Toward a Broader View of Values in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of
Health, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 7, 9-12 (1999).
410. See supra notes 105-111.
411. Suvi Maklin et al., Quality-Adjusted Life-Years for the Estimation of Effectiveness of
Screening Programs: A Systematic Literature Review, 28 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE
145, 148 (2012).
412. Arias, supra note 137, at 2.
413. Janel Hanmer et al., Report of Nationally Representative Values for the
Noninstitutionalized US Adult Population for 7 Health-Related Quality-of-Life Scores, 26 MED.
DECISION MAKING 391, 396 (2006).
414. Johansson-Stenman & Martinsson, supra note 105, at 748.
415. Eisenberg et al., supra note 110, at 153.
416. Carlsson et al., supra note 109, at 1814.
417. See Eric Nord, An Alternative to QALY: The Saved Young Life Equivalent (SAVE), 305
BRIT. MED. J. 875, 876 (1992) (outlining person tradeoff questions as a way of incorporating




so little data.4 8 Again, this discrepancy makes sense. People care about the fact
that children have more years ahead of them, but this is not necessarily all that
people care about. For example, they may care that children have not had their
fair innings yet.419 QALYs do not account for fair innings arguments, and thus
it is reasonable to suspect that the social value of protecting children vs. adults
will be higher than indicated just by their relative remaining QALYs. This
suggests that some form of age-weighting20 could better align CEA with
societal values regarding childhood risk reductions.
The need for age-weighting is even more pronounced in the context of
non-fatal illnesses. It seems likely that, from a societal vantage point, people
would exhibit a child premium for both fatal and non-fatal risks. 4 2 1 Yet QALYs
do not offer any implicit child premium for preventing such illnesses. Consider
an illness that causes the patient to be hospitalized for one month, and requires
an additional eleven months for full recovery. A CEA using unweighted
QALYs would not distinguish between rograms that prevented 100 of these
illnesses in children rather than adults, even though one 2011 study asked
subjects about this illness and found a 1,900% child premium.423 This again
suggests that some form of age-weighting could better align CEA with societal
preferences.
V. Conclusion
The child premium and the alternate-models approach represent two
simple innovations to administrative practice. The child premium illustrates the
potential to rigorously incorporate commonly held values within the VSL. The
existing evidence suggests that the child premium is not merely an artifact of
biases. Instead, the child premium reflects welfare-relevant preferences that are
readily cognizable as reasonable responses to the blurring of self and other that
parents experience. This Article's defense of the child premium should leave
418. The magnitude of the discrepancy may also be affected by the particular methodology
used to elicit societal preferences. R. Baker et al., Weighting and Valuing Quality-Adjusted Life-Years
Using Stated Preference Methods, 14 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT ix-x (2010).
419. Aki Tsuchiya, Age-Related Preferences and Age Weighting Health Benefits, 48 Soc. SC.
& MED. 267, 273-74 (1999).
420. Aki Tsuchiya, QALYs and Ageism: Philosophical Theories and Age Weighting, 9
HEALTH ECON. 57, 57-58, 61 (2000) (discussing age weights within CEA); Ubel et al., supra note 408,
at 893 (same). A close cousin of QALYs-disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)-already incorporates
age weights. MILLER ET AL., supra note 395, at 89-90. However, DALYs use age weights to reflect
social productivity rather than WTP, and hence place greater weight on protecting the most productive
age groups: younger adults. Id.
421. The studies in Section L.A showed that parents exhibit a child premium for both fatal and
non-fatal risks.
422. Tsuchiya et al., supra note 112, at 691 ("The standard assumption in the literature on
QALYs is that the decrement in quality of life due to a given health problem is independent of the
person's age.").
423. Eisenberg et al., supra note 110, at 151 (finding that most people chose to prevent the
illness in 100 children rather than preventing it in 2,000 sixty-year-olds).
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readers optimistic about the possibility that social science research can uncover
and defend other, even more impactful, VSL premiums and CBA innovations.
In order to help motivate this research, and to provide a framework within
which agencies can experiment with these innovations, this Article outlined the
alternate-models approach. This approach represents an improvement over
existing agency practice because it helps agencies drive innovation rather than
follow it, helps them communicate model uncertainty to more democratically
accountable institutions, and makes it harder to view CBA as an answer
machine. More concretely, the alternate-models approach offers a useful
middle path for the EPA's cancer premium and a useful way to begin exploring
other CBA innovations. The implications of the child premium are not,
moreover, limited to CBA. The studies described in this Article strongly
suggest that CEA would better reflect societal preferences for allocating scarce
health care resources if it incorporated age-weights that favored children.
124
Vol. 30, 2013
